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DEATH TO CREDIT AS LEVERAGE: USING THE
BANK ANTI-TYING PROVISION TO CURB
FINANCIAL RISK
FELIX B. CHANG*
Today, the need for nimble financial regulation is paramount.
The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill has not prevented further scan-
dals and will not stop banks from selling risky products. Yet one un-
derstudied law is a surprisingly versatile device that has the potential
to temper financial risk: the Bank Holding Company Act's Anti-Tying
Provision. The Anti-Tying Provision prohibits banks from requiring
borrowers to purchase additional products in order to obtain a loan. It
applies antitrust principles to bank sales and lending practices. Under
antitrust law, a seller cannot condition the availability of one item (the
desired product) on the consumer's purchase of another item (the tied
product). Similarly, the Anti-Tying Provision limits when banks can
condition the availability of credit on a borrower's purchase of another
product. In the last two decades, those limits have been eroded by nu-
merous exceptions.
This Article recasts the Anti-Tying Provision as a bulwark
against financial risk. Specifically, this Article proposes narrowing the
exceptions to the Anti-Tying Provision so as to reduce the types of in-
vestment products that can be tied to loans. Further, this Article argues
that plaintiffs in bank tying actions need only prove the existence of a
tying requirement, rather than actual coercion. Bolstered in these two
ways, the Anti-Tying Provision can curtail sales of risky financial
products to borrowers.
An expanded role for the Anti-Tying Provision draws upon four
theoretical underpinnings. First, this approach approximates the sepa-
ration between commercial and investment banking that was central to
the Glass-Steagall Act and is again resurgent with the Volcker Rule.
Second, recent developments in antitrust scholarship suggest that credit
can be manipulated as leverage and rate evasion. Third, borrower wel-
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fare is the proper framework from which to evaluate tying, so the effect
of leveraging credit should be analyzed for its harm to borrowers, not its
benefit to banks. Fourth, one lesson from the financial crisis is that
antitrust law must be concerned with more than efficiency. By exten-
sion, the Anti-Tying Provision should be viewed as serving broad goals
such as mitigating financial risk.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A common maxim among bankers in the aftermath of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank") is that banks will continue to make money.
They will just have to work harder to do so. Passed in response
to the global financial crisis of 2008, Dodd-Frank has been a
lightning rod for criticism, from both the right and the left.'
The coincidence of Dodd-Frank's two-year anniversary and an-
other spate of financial scandals, including the rigging of the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), highlights the act's
limited ability to prevent future crises.2 If anything, banks
seem to have responded to greater regulation with greater
risk-taking.3 The act may therefore have the perverse effect of
spurring another period of financial experimentation. As bank
divisions affected by Dodd-Frank find new ways to make
money, regulators will need a framework that can check unbri-
dled experimentation with financial products not yet devised.
At this juncture, effective reform of the banking sector
may well hinge upon existing laws that have withstood the give-
and-take between industry and regulators-in particular, mod-
est yet adaptable laws that have been flanked by less fanfare
1. This includes criticisms that the act is overreaching, reactive rather
than proactive, and hampered by a lengthy rulemaking process. See, e.g.,
Aaron Nessel, Letter to the Editor, Regulating the Banks, N.Y. TrmIs, Jan. 24,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/opinion/regulating-the-banks.
html; Scott D. O'Malia, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, Opening Statement, Open Meeting on One Final Rule and One
Proposed Rule (Feb. 23, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement022312); Dodd-Frank Inter-
active Implementation Timeline, DAVIS POILK, http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-
frank/Implementation-Timeline/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
2. See Could Dodd-Frank Prevent Another Financial Crisis?, MONEY TALKING
(July 13, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/shows/moneytalking/2012/jul/13/.
3. See, e.g.,JPMorgan Chase & Co., Form 8-K (July 13, 2012) (detailing a
$4.4 billion trading loss).
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than Dodd-Frank. One such law is the anti-tying provision
under the Bank Holding Company Act (the "Anti-Tying Provi-
sion"), which generally prohibits a bank from requiring that a
borrower purchase another product or service in order to ob-
tain a loan, a concept taken from tying restrictions under the
Sherman and Clayton acts. 4 The Anti-Tying Provision occupies
a sleepy corner of banking regulations, having seen little aca-
demic coverage in the 42 years since its enactment.5 To date,
this law's enforcement remains lax despite empirical evidence
on not only the prevalence, but also the impact, of aggressive
tying practices. Such evidence includes two key studies on
bank tying in the United States and Europe.6 Recent actions
by the British Financial Services Authority against banks that
have pushed swaps onto borrowers also shed light into the per-
vasiveness of tying on both sides of the Atlantic.7
This Article advocates taking a fresh look at the Anti-Ty-
ing Provision as one possible tool in the arsenal of financial
reform. Under the Anti-Tying Provision, if a borrower wishes
to obtain one product, usually credit (in antitrust parlance,
4. The Anti-Tying Provision is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1972. It also known
as "Section 106," referring to the section it occupies in the Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970.
5. But see, e.g., Christian A. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives:
Untying the Antitying Restrictions, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (2001) [hereinafter John-
son, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives]; Christian A. Johnson, Holding Credit
Hostage for Undenriting Ransom: Rethinking Bank Anti-Tying Rules, 64 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 157 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage]; Richard K.
Kim, The Federal Reserve's Proposed Interpretation Regarding the Anti-Tying Restric-
tions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 8 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1 (2004); Timothy D. Naegele, The Anti-Tying Provision: Its Po-
tential Is Still There, 100 BANKING L.J. 138 (1983); and Timothy D. Naegele,
The Bank Holding Company Act's Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, 122 BANK-
ING L.J. 195 (2005) [hereinafter Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later].
6. Ass'N OF FIN. PROF'LS, 2004 CREDIT ACCESS SURVEY: LINKING CORPO-
RATE CREDIT TO THE AWARDING OF OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (June 2004)
[hereinafter AFP SURVEY]; CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POIcy STUDIES, TYING AND
OTHER POTENTIAIX UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE RETAIL FINANCIAL
SERVICE SECTOR, submitted to the European Commission (2009), http://ec.
europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/2010/tying en.htm [hereinafter
EU TYING REPORT]. These studies show that tying is experienced by a signifi-
cant proportion of borrowers, to the detriment of transparency and con-
sumer choice. For further details, see infra Part II.C.
7. See FSA Finds Banks Guilty of Mis-selling to Small Firms, BBC NEWS (Une
29, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18640101 [hereinafter SA
Finds Banks Guilty].
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the "tying" or "desired" product), a bank cannot require the
borrower to also purchase another product (the "tied" prod-
uct) from the bank or its affiliate." The rule does permit the
tying of "traditional bank products" such as deposits and trust
services,9 an exception which has been expanded in the last
two decades.' With a few adjustments-for instance, slowing
the growth of the traditional bank products exception-the
Anti-Tying Provision could become versatile enough to pre-
vent commercial banks from pushing risky financial products
upon borrowers in the future.
Discourse on the Anti-Tying Provision has unfolded on a
highly technical level, with little imagination of how a more
robust rule might serve the financial sector. The most recent
flurry of commentary on the Anti-Tying Provision dates back
to 2003, when the Federal Reserve issued a set of tentative in-
terpretations on the law (the "Proposed Interpretation")." In
the Proposed Interpretation, the Federal Reserve attempted to
clarify when tying practices might meet the Anti-Tying Provi-
sion's many exceptions and safe harbors. 12 The agency also
suggested that banks could tie loans to certain derivatives,
8. For example, a bank cannot require a borrower to purchase life in-
surance from an affiliated insurance agency in order to obtain a loan. See
infra Part II.A.
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (A) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b) (1) (2006).
10. Thus, a bank can require a borrower to set up a checking account
with the bank or use the bank to administer a trust for the borrower to get a
loan. See infra Part II.A.
11. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Anti-Tying Re-
strictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 68
Fed. Reg. 50204 (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Proposed Interpretation]. To
date, the Federal Reserve has not taken final action on the Proposed Inter-
pretation, so its effect is questionable. Yet subsequent materials on the Anti-
Tying Provision have cited the Proposed Interpretation as an authority. See,
e.g., Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Securities Activities of Banks in the
GLB Era: Anti-Tying Guidance and Operational Risk Issues, Materials for the SIA
Compliance and Legal Division Annual Seminar, Hollywood, FL, Mar. 22,
2006.
12. The sheer volume of exceptions threatens to swallow the rule, so that
the Anti-Tying Provision resembles the proverbial swiss cheese with more
holes than cheese. Elsewhere, the characterization as more-holes-than-
cheese has often signaled that a doctrine is ripe for re-evaluation. See, e.g.,
Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387 (2006) (the
Sixth Amendment and sentencing); Richard D. Friedman, Who Said the Craw-
ford Revolution Would Be Easy?, 26 WTR CRIM.JUST. 14 (2012) (the Confronta-
tion Clause and the hearsay rule).
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
2013]1 855
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
such as interest rate, foreign exchange, and credit default
swaps.' 3 Derivatives are financial instruments whose value is
based on the value of other assets or variables-for example,
the movement of interest rates, the price of stock, or whether a
party defaults on a loan.14 In hindsight, the Proposed Interpre-
tation's deference to derivatives has proven to be colossally
misguided. The financial crisis was brought on in large part by
these products. Derivatives as seemingly innocuous as interest
rate swaps compounded exposure to fluctuations in interest
rate spreads, wreaking havoc on borrowers in a series of high-
profile bankruptcies.' 5 Among the shortcomings of existing
literature, this failure-to recognize the fallout from the ero-
sion of the Anti-Tying Provision-looms largest.
This Article proposes using the Anti-Tying Provision to re-
duce financial risk by limiting the ability of banks to engage in
tying. Further, this Article proposes two adjustments to the
Anti-Tying Provision, so as to better enable regulators (and
also borrowers, who have a private right of action) to chal-
lenge bank tying activity.' 6 The first adjustment is for regula-
tors to recalibrate the pace of enlargement of the traditional
bank products exception. The lesson from the financial crisis
is that introduction of risky financial instruments to the mar-
ket must be done deliberately rather than haphazardly. The
second adjustment-or more precisely, a clarification-is to
dispense with any requirement upon borrower-claimants to
show that they were coerced into purchasing a tied product. A
more suitable alternative would be for claimants to show that
purchasing the tied product was required. This would resolve a
circuit split in the way courts have interpreted the elements of
the Anti-Tying Provision.
13. See Proposed Interpretation, sup-a note 11, at 52028, 52030.
14. Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial
Regulation, 17 L. & Bus. REV. Am. 279, 283 (2011).
15. On the bankruptcy ofJefferson County, Alabama, see Congressman
Spencer T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the Predicament of Municipal Fi-
nance, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 759 (2009); Kyle Whitmire & Mary Williams Walsh,
High Finance Backfires on Alabama County, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/business/12bama.html?_r-1 &fta=y. On the
recent actions against U.K. banks for tying interest rate swaps to small busi-
ness loans, see iSA Finds Banks Guilty, supra note 7.
16. See infra Part III.A. These are substantive changes to the law. A subse-
quent piece will explore procedural changes, such as whistleblower provi-
sions and affidavits from bank officials certifying the absence of tying.
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This Article breaks new ground in bank anti-tying scholar-
ship by recasting the Anti-Tying Provision as an instrument for
the type of meaningful reform envisioned by, but far from be-
ing realized in, the embattled Dodd-Frank Act. There is an ele-
gance in the Anti-Tying Provision that may help stave off the
next financial crisis. In principle, this set of tying restrictions
prevents banks from foisting unwanted products and services
upon customers, except under limited circumstances. Narrow-
ing those circumstances can insulate one slice of the econ-
omy-borrowers-from the harms of risky tied products. If
risky financial products cannot be pushed into the economy by
being tied to loans, then if those products tank precipitously in
value, fewer entities will be exposed and contagion will be
more easily contained. Having weathered four decades of eco-
nomic cycles and disparate regulatory philosophies, the Anti-
Tying Provision is an apt instrument of financial reform; for
the decades have illuminated a sensible equilibrium where the
rule should rest, balancing risk and innovation.
A fresh look at the Anti-Tying Provision is also timely be-
cause of novel turns in the academic literature on antitrust
law. The financial crisis has led to intense soul-searching
within the antitrust community. Scholars have wrestled with
whether the laissez-faire approach of the Chicago School,
which has dominated antitrust jurisprudence in recent de-
cades, might have contributed to the deference to markets
that led to such spectacular bank collapses.' 7 Meanwhile,
within the circle of antitrust scholars interested in tying, Einer
Elhauge's 2009 article Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of
the Single Monopoly Profit Theory has also touched off spirited
debate over tying's anticompetitive effects.18 Even bank anti-
trust law has not been immune from the post-2008 introspec-
tion, although most of the scrutiny has centered on bank
17. The Chicago School began as a response to the aggressiveness of the
Warren Court and the justice Department's antitrust enforcement in the
1960s. It was canonized as the leading approach to antitrust during the Rea-
gan Administration. With efficiency as its rallying cry, the Chicago School
advocated a lighter touch to enforcement. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST Poucv: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 2 (4th ed.
2010) at § 2. For more, see infra Part V,
18. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Mo-
nopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REv. 397 (2009).
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mergers. 9 Only the Anti-Tying Provision, that infusion of anti-
trust principles into bank sales and lending practices, seems to
have been untouched by the renewal of scholarly interest.
Consequently, several controversial positions on bank tying re-
main in the public domain without reevaluation from a post-
crisis perspective. 201
Part II of this Article traces the history of the Anti-Tying
Provision, including the expansion of the traditional bank
products exception and the consequences of that expansion.
Part III argues that slowing the pace of enlargement of
the traditional bank products exception sensibly cabins finan-
cial experimentation, until an innovative product has weath-
ered the economic fluctuations or regulatory deliberation and
is accepted as a traditional banking product. This part also rec-
ommends that the Anti-Tying Provision be interpreted to re-
quire claimants in tying actions demonstrate the requirement of
purchasing a tied product, rather than coercion into purchasing
a tied product. This part then addresses the potential criticism
that borrowers are not a group which requires protection
against financial risk, either because borrowers are often large
and sophisticated entities or because financial reform de-
signed to benefit borrowers does not touch upon a sufficiently
broad cross-section of the economy.
Part IV situates the Anti-Tying Provision within a broader
regulatory philosophy-most notably reflected in the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Volcker Rule-which separates commer-
cial activity (e.g., deposit-taking) from investment activity.21
This delineation helps keep volatile financial instruments se-
19. See, e.g., Too Big to Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in
Financial Regulation Reform (Part II), Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Ad-
ministrative Law of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
20. E.g., Letter from R. Hewitt Page, Assist. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJus-
tice Antitrust Div., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Federal Reserve (Nov. 7,
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/201459.
htm [hereinafter DOJ Letter] (arguing that the Anti-Tying Provision should
not be read as more restrictive than the general antitrust laws). See also infra
Part V.
21. Enacted in 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act sought to separate commer-
cial banking from investment banking. See MEIANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES Ac-
TIVITIES OF BANKS §§ 1.02, 4.01-4.03 (3d ed. 1997). The Volcker Rule, one of
the most controversial sections under Dodd-Frank, prohibits federally in-
sured banks and their affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading and
owning hedge funds and private equity funds. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
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questered to investment banking, which tends to be domi-
nated by more sophisticated clients.
Part V draws analogies to general antitrust law to support
the recommendations in this Article. This part begins with the
anticompetitive effects of bank tying and then concludes with
a re-evaluation of the goals of antitrust law. In totality, this part
anticipates and addresses the critique that the Anti-Tying Pro-
vision was grounded in antitrust principles, so it would be a
transgression of Congressional intent to construe the rule as
serving any goal beyond fostering competition. As legislative
history, subsequent case law, and academic literature indicate,
the goals of antitrust law are much more nuanced than a sin-
gular focus on competition.22
II.
THE EROSION OF BANK TYING RESTRICTIONS
The Anti-Tying Provision prohibits a bank from offering a
product or service (usually credit) on the condition that a cus-
tomer either (i) obtain another product or service (the tied
product) from the bank or one of its affiliates or (ii) refrain
from obtaining a tied product from the bank's competitors.23
By way of illustration, suppose that a real estate developer, Bill
Borrower ("Borrower"), approaches a bank ("Bank") about
the possibility of securing a loan (the desired product) to
purchase waterfront property for development. Bank offers
22. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
Rtev. 191 (2008); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concerns of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINas L.J. 65
(1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Con-
cerns of Antitrust].
23. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52027. In application,
courts and commentators have generally broken down these two require-
ments into some combination of the following five elements: specifically, a
tying arrangement must (i) involve two separate products or services; (ii) be
anticompetitive; (iii) convey a benefit to the bank; (iv) bring damage to the
claimant; and (v) be unusual and not subject to an exception. See, e.g.,John-
son, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 21 (five elements);
Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5, at 202 (three ele-
ments); Doe v. Northwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1304 (8th Cir.
1997) (four elements); Kenty v. Bank One, 92 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 1996)
(three elements); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 11 F.3d 1260, 1268
(5th Cir. 1994) (three elements).
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Borrower a variable-rate loan at prime rate plus 5 percent (the
"Rate").2 4 Under the Anti-Tying Provision, Bank cannot then
indicate to Borrower that the loan and the Rate are condi-
tioned upon Borrower's purchase of another product (the tied
product)-for example, a life insurance policy (Figure 1).
loan life insurance
Desired Product Tied Product
FIGURE 1. EXAMPLE OF A PROHIBITED TIE
If, however, the tied product falls within the traditional
bank products exception, tying is permissible. Trust services,
for instance, are considered a traditional bank product. There-
fore, Bank may condition the availability of Borrower's loan or
the Rate upon Borrower's utilization of Bank's trust services
(Figure 2).
loan trust services
Desired Product Tied Product
FIGuRE 2. EXAMPLE OF A PERMITTED TIE
This Part begins by tracing the history of the exceptions to
the Anti-Tying Provision, including, most prominently, the
traditional bank products exception. Collectively, these excep-
tions have weakened bank tying restrictions on several fronts.
This Part then explores the consequences of regulators rush-
ing to sanction tying practices. These practices have subjected
broad swathes of the economy to various financial instru-
ments, some-such as derivatives and securities lending-sub-
24. The prime rate is published in the The Wall Street Journal and fluctu-
ates daily.
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sequently proven to entail far more risk than originally fore-
seen.
A. The Expansion of "Traditional Bank Products"
The basis for the traditional bank products exception
rests in language from 12 U.S.C. § 1972 providing that a "bank
shall not . .. extend credit . . . on the condition or require-
ment . . . that the customer shall obtain some additional
credit, property, or service from such bank other than a loan,
discount, deposit, or trust serice."25 The Federal Reserve is au-
thorized to grant additional exceptions by regulation or or-
der.26 Hence, traditional bank products may be defined either
by statute-as in the above case of a loan, discount, deposit, or
trust service offered by a bank 27-or by regulation-as in the
extension of the loan, discount, deposit, or trust service ex-
emption to an affiliate of a bank.28
Returning to the earlier illustration of Borrower and
Bank, we can imagine Bank informing Borrower that the rate
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 12 U.S.C. § 1972
reads as follows:
(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit ... or furnish any
service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, on
the condition or requirement-
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit,
property, or service [the "Additional Service"] from such bank
other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some [Additional Service]
from a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company [collectively, "Bank
Affiliates"];
(C) that the customer provide some [Additional Service] to
such bank, other than those related to and usually provided in
connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(D) that the customer provide some [Additional Service] to a
[Bank Affiliate]; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some [Additional Ser-
vice] from a competitor of such bank [or] its [Bank Affiliate],
other than a condition or requirement that such bank shall
reasonably impose in a credit transaction to assure the sound-
ness of the credit.
26. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52024.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (A) (2006).
28. This came by way of Regulation Y. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b) (1) (i)
(2005).
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of the loan is the prime rate plus five percent only if Borrower
uses Bank as the trustee to administer a pool of Borrower's
assets in trust. This would be permitted under the Anti-Tying
Provision, since trust services offered by Bank are a statutorily
permitted tied product. If Bank's trust services are run instead
by a trust company that happens to be a sister company to
Bank, then Bank can also impose the condition of purchasing
trust services from the affiliate, since the permitted tie has
been extended by regulation to the affiliate.
Over time, this notion of traditional bank products has
become the most significant protection for bank tying prac-
tices-even though 12 U.S.C. § 1972 does not contain the
words "traditional bank product."29 This exception, narrow in
conception, was grounded in the drafters' intention to convey
to the Federal Reserve the ability to enumerate additional ex-
emptions.30 Yet the array of products and services that have
made the list of permissible ties reveals the enormous distance
that has been traveled from the original language of the Anti-
Tying Provision in the short time since its adoption in 1970. In
issuing the Proposed Interpretation, the Federal Reserve
counted sixteen types of traditional bank products, including
bank-issued credit derivatives, loan syndications, asset manage-
ment services, and securities lending (Figure 3).31 Intense lob-
bying by the banking industry has focused on classifying prob-
lematic tying practices under the rubric of traditional bank
products. 32 As characterized by attorney Timothy Naegele,
who helped write the Anti-Tying Provision, "[t]he exemption
for 'traditional banking practices,' which should have been
very narrow in its effect, has become what is tantamount to the
eye of a needle through which 'herds of camels' have been
29. The statute merely names "loan, discount, deposit, or trust service" as
permissible tied products. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (A). Yet this language has
formed the basis for permitting tied products as traditional bank products.
See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52025.
30. See S. REPi'. No. 91-1084 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519,
5558 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] ("[I]t is not the intention of the commit-
tee that it cover traditional banking arrangements which at least in some situa-
tions have no significant anticompetitive effects.") (statement of Sen.
Brooke).
31. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52030.
32. See Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5, at n.6.
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The classification of derivatives as a permissible tied prod-
uct is particularly troubling. The enactment of the Anti-Tying
Provision predates the burgeoning of derivatives. Yet when the
Federal Reserve issued the Proposed Interpretation, the
33. Id.
34. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52030.
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agency revealed a willingness to permit the tying of these in-
struments under several novel theories.3 5
The first theory was that derivatives are a traditional bank
product. Embedded in the Proposed Interpretation's list of
traditional bank products were "[c]redit derivatives where the
bank or affiliate is the seller of credit protection."3 6 Although
the authors did not provide examples or further guidance,
credit derivatives would likely have included credit default
swaps, which enable a swap buyer to make payments in ex-
change for a swap seller's obligation to pay a third party upon
the occurrence of a credit event-for example, default on an
underlying loan.3 7 Credit derivatives in general are a relatively
new type of derivative, 38 and credit default swaps in particular
are widely thought to be responsible for the financial crisis.3 9
Another basis for allowing the tying of swaps to credit lay
in the caveat to the exclusive dealing restriction under the
Anti-Tying Provision, which reads: a "bank shall not ... extend
credit . .. on the condition or requirement . . . that the cus-
tomer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or service
from a competitor of such bank . . . other than a condition or
requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a credit trans-
action to assure the soundness of the credit. "40 Exclusive dealing is
the practice by which a seller inhibits customers from ob-
taining products from its competitors. These arrangements are
prohibited by the Anti-Tying Provision, but an exception exists
to preserve the ability of banks to protect their lines of
credit.41 Thus, under the Proposed Interpretation, a bank
35. The Proposed Interpretation actually begins the discussion on deriva-
tives from a position of uncertainty. See id. at 52027-28 ("The Board requests
comment on how interest rate swaps, foreign exchange swaps, and other
derivative products that often are connected with lending transactions
should be treated under section 106."). Given this starting point, it is odd
that the Federal Reserve then does a pirouette to conclude that these very
products might be permissible. See id. at 52030, 52032.
36. Id. at 52030.
37. See infra Part III.B. See also Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing
Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 677, 708 (2002).
38. Id. at 707.
39. See Sharma, supra note 14, at 280. For an illustration of how credit
default swaps work, see infra Part II.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (E) (2011); Proposed Interpretation, supra note
11, at 52032.
41. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52032.
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could condition the availability of a floating-rate loan on the
borrower's purchase of an interest rate swap from the bank or
an affiliate.42 Interest rate swaps simulate the effects of a fixed
rate loan by having a swap buyer make fixed payments to a
swap seller, who in turn pays the buyer variable rates; until the
recent financial crisis, these instruments were considered to be
fairly safe.4 3
We can only speculate how the Federal Reserve became
comfortable with derivatives, despite a spate of derivatives de-
bacles in the 1990s; 44 the Proposed Release is cursory and con-
clusory as to specific tied products. Yet it appears that the
agency moved toward permitting these ties not out of satisfac-
tion that the instruments presented little risk, but out of a will-
ingness to push the boundaries of the "traditional bank prod-
ucts" exception as well as to explore other loopholes within
the Anti-Tying Provision. 45
B. The Risk in Tied Investment Products
This Subpart analyzes the damage wrought by two types of
products and services that made the Proposed Interpretation's
list of permissible tied products: over-the-counter derivatives
and securities lending services.
1. Over-the-Counter Derivatives
The Proposed Interpretation paved the way for the tying
of two types of swaps in particular, one relatively novel (credit
derivatives) and one rather established (interest rate deriva-
42. The Proposed Interpretation envisions a scenario where a bank
might prevent a borrower from purchasing an interest rate swap from "less
creditworthy competitors of the bank," but this condition can be invoked to
effectively keep swap purchases to banks and their affiliates. See id.
43. See infra Part II.B.1, for an illustration.
44. For a discussion of the experiences of Orange County and Procter &
Gamble with derivatives, see FRANK PARTNOY, INFFCTIOUS GREED: How Di-
CEIT AND RISK CORRUFTED THE FINANCIAL, MARKETS (2009).
45. Additionally, at two importantjunctures in the 1990s, the Federal Re-
serve backpedaled on protections which the Anti-Tying Provision had previ-
ously conveyed. See 60 Fed. Reg. 20186 (Apr. 25, 1995) (promulgating the
"combined balance discount" safe harbor which permitted the tying of non-
traditional bank products); 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (Feb. 28, 1997) (rescinding
the application of the Anti-Tying Provision to bank holding companies and
their nonbank subsidiaries).
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tives), but neither thought to have been capable of creating
the chaos seen since 2008.46 Derivatives are instruments whose
value fluctuates on the basis of another set of assets or vari-
ables.47 While derivatives have been around in rudimentary
form for hundreds of years, 48 the rapid innovation surround-
ing credit default and interest rate swaps started in the 1980s.
These two instruments are not traded on open markets but are
customized between contracting parties. Hence, they are
termed "over-the-counter" ("OTC") derivatives-as opposed to
exchange-traded derivatives, which now constitute only a small
minority of derivatives. From 1990 until the fourth quarter of
2009, the "notional value" of derivatives-that is, the face value
of each contract, used as a basis for calculating payment be-
tween the parties-grew from roughly $5 trillion to $212.8 tril-
lion. 49 OTC derivatives dominated trading activity.1o
The rise of credit derivatives, and in particular credit de-
fault swaps ("CDSs"), has been consistent with this backdrop of
expanding activity.5 ' Used wisely, credit default swaps can be
helpful-swap buyers obtain guarantee of payment from swap
sellers upon the occurrence certain "credit events," such as
bankruptcy of the swap buyer or default on the underlying
contract.52 Therefore, these instruments function like insur-
ance protections. For example, in purchasing a loan from
Bank, Borrower might fear that renovations to the waterfront
46. For a synopsis of how regulators misjudged derivatives, see Saule T.
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of
Banking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
47. Sharma, supra note 14, at 283.
48. JERRY MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Vol. I,
265 (2002).
49. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER
2009 (2009) [hereinafter OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2009 REPORT].
50. Id.
51. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROILILER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER
2008 6 (2008) [hereinafter OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2008 REPORT] (detailing
how credit derivatives grew at a 100% compounded annual rate from 2003
to 2008). Credit default swaps comprise 98% of all credit derivatives. Id.
52. Sharma, supra note 14, at 287. The definitions of "credit event" are
taken from the standard documentation of the International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association ("ISDA"), a derivatives trade group whose documenta-
tion has become the industry standard for most derivatives deals. See
PARTNOv, supra note 44.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
866 [Vol. 9:851
BANK ANTI-TYING PROVISION
property end up being more extensive than anticipated. If
Borrower has to pay his general contractors more, then the
ensuing reduction in cash on hand could trigger default
under Borrower's loan with Bank. Therefore, to "hedge" (or
mitigate) that risk, Borrower might purchase a CDS which
obliges the swap seller to step into Buyer's shoes upon an
event of default and make payments on the loan to Bank.
Derivatives are also commonly-and pejoratively-called
"bets." Yet the stakes are far higher for contracting parties
(often called the "counterparties") than in an ordinary insur-
ance contract or bet, because counterparties are entitled to
calibrate payments several orders of magnitude larger than
what default on the underlying contract alone would have en-
tailed. Hence, counterparties as colossal as Lehman Brothers
and American International Group (AIG) were quickly
brought down by credit default swaps. In the case of Lehman
Brothers, the bank had taken out CDSs to mitigate its expo-
sure to the housing market. As that market collapsed, Lehman
was obligated under the CDS contracts to post more and more
collateral. When it could no longer do so, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., the financial holding company for one of the
most prestigious and storied investment banks in American
history, had to file for bankruptcy.53 As for AIG, the insurance
giant had written $1.8 trillion in CDSs guaranteeing payment
if certain mortgage-backed securities experienced credit
events.5 4 Instability in the housing market led AIG to write
down over $30 billion in losses to its CDS portfolio.55 Fearing
the same fate as Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York pumped $85 billion into AIG, in the form of a
revolving two-year credit facility that operated as a bailout.56
Losses suffered by purchasers of interest rate swaps have
been no less catastrophic. These swaps constitute the majority
of OTC derivatives, dwarfing even CDSs.57 They can benefit
53. For a summary of the Lehman collapse, see Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. No. 2 (2011).
54. Sharma, supra note 14, at 293.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See OFFICE OF THFE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIvEs ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER
2011 6 (2011) [hereinafter OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2011 REPoRT]; OCC's
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purchasers by turning variable-rate obligations into ones with
synthetic fixed rates.58 For many years, they were thought to be
safe, "plain vanilla" instruments. Even after the financial crisis,
some have argued that interest rate swaps were not implicated
in the tumult.5 ' Yet early defenders of interest rate swaps did
not foresee the enormity of market isk-or exposure to market
movements-from plummeting interest rates. Buyers seek out
interest rate derivatives because they anticipate that the syn-
thetic fixed rate will be less volatile than floating rates, which
can ebb and flow unpredictably. The "bet" in the minds of buy-
ers is that the synthetic fixed rate will on balance be less than
the average rate from floating rate fluctuations. In effect, buy-
ers wager that interest rates will increase; if this happens, buy-
ers will be "in the money" on the swaps.
However, if interest rates dip below the synthetic fixed
rate, buyers will be "out of the money." For instance, Borrower
from our illustration might be offered a loan at prime rate
plus 5 percent (the "Rate"), at a time when the prime rate is
hovering around 3 percent. Borrower might be willing to pay a
hefty fee to purchase an interest rate swap that mimics a fixed
rate of 8 percent. Under the swap, Borrower would pay the
swaps seller 8 percent on the underlying loan while the seller
pays Bank (the issuer of the loan) the variable Rate. So long as
the Rate is greater than 8 percent, Borrower is in the money
because Borrower pays the swaps seller less than what the
swaps seller pays Bank.
With the financial crisis, however, banks were suddenly re-
luctant to lend-credit became scarce, and to induce lending
activity, the central bank dropped interest rates to record lows.
Interest rate swap contracts unexpectedly "turned toxic" as
swap purchasers became sharply out of the money (since inter-
est rates were so far below the synthetic fixed rates).60 In the
FouRTH QUARTER 2009 REPORT, supra note 49; OCC's FoURTH QUARTER
2008 REPORT, supra note 51.
58. Feder, supra note 37, at 702-05.
59. See Laurin C. Ariail, Note and Comment, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on
End-Users Hedging Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15
N.C. BANKING INST. 175, 190 (2011) (quoting an industry report in Michael
Chistalla, OTC Derivatives: A New Market Infrastructure is Taking Shape, at 4
(2010), available at http://www.dbresearch.com).
60. Martin Z. Braun, Jefferson County $5 Billion Swap Spree Prompts Alabama
Derivatives Curbs, BLooMBERG (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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most notable example, in 2002 Jefferson County, the largest
county in Alabama, had agreed on the advice of JPMorgan
Chase & Co. to refinance $3 billion in public works debt into
floating-rate bonds, hedged by more than $5.4 billion in inter-
est rate derivatives.' Soon the county would teeter on the
brink of bankruptcy, the derivatives salesman would land in
prison, and the county official who signed onto the deal would
be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 62
More recently, the revelation that Barclays had conspired
to lower LIBOR has subjected the cartel of U.K. banks that set
LIBOR to a slew of class action lawsuits by municipal and pen-
sion fund purchasers of interest rate swaps.6 - While the claims
garnering the most press have been antitrust claims for con-
spiracy and rate manipulation, the principle harm suffered by
the claimants stemmed from consistent out-of-the-money posi-




61. Id. See also Bachus, supra note 15, at 759; Whitmire & Walsh, supra
note 15.
62. Whitmire & Walsh, supra note 15. There were other reasons why this
deal imploded-corruption and graft among them. See Matt Taibbi, Looting
Main Street: How the Nation's Biggest Banks Are Ripping off American Cities with
the Same Predatory Deals that Brought Down Greece, ROL.LING STONE, Apr. 15,
2010. This is not to suggest, then, that a more robust Anti-Tying Provision
will be a panacea against all bad swaps deals.
63. See Alistair Osborne, Banks Face Billions of Dollars of Claims After Bar-
clays Settles, THF. TELEGRAPH (June 27, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9360485/Banks-face-billions-of-
dollars-of-claims-after-Barclays-settles.html. Called "the world's most impor-
tant number," LIBOR is the average of interest rates that a panel of London
banks would charge to lend to one another. LIBOR often forms the basis for
determining variable-rate obligations. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Why and How
Should the Libor be Reformed? (June 26, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-2094542; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming IBOR: Wheatley Versus
the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 789 (2013); Mark Broad, The World's Most
Important Number?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/7680552.stm.
64. See Jennifer Thompson & Brooke Masters, Banks to Repay SMEs for
Mis-sold Swaps, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 2012 (detailing the sale of interest rate
swaps as hedging products gone awry once interest rates stayed at historic
lows, triggering large cancelation and refinancing penalties).
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2. Securities Lending and Ancillary Custody Services
It now appears that other products and services that have
made their way into the traditional banking products excep-
tion may prove catastrophic as well. Recently, the Securities
and Exchange Commission indicated that it would be taking a
closer look at securities lending, the process by which an insti-
tution holding vast amounts of stock lends out some of that
portfolio temporarily, typically to hedge funds that engage in
short selling and need securities to back their positions.66 Like
OTC derivatives, this was a process that had a long history but
only took off in recent decades. 66
Prior to the financial crisis, securities lending was seen as
an innocuous practice in which mutual funds, pension plans,
and other institutional investors were the lenders. Securities
borrowers would provide collateral to securities lenders for the
loaned portfolio; if the collateral was cash, securities lenders
would often make leveraged investments with that cash. These
investments experienced significant losses after 2008 with mar-
ket declines. 67
The securities lending services provided by banks to their
customers would have facilitated the lending of those custom-
65. See Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening
Statement, Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable (Sept. 29, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch092909
mls.htm); see also Rachelle Younglai, SEC Mulls Securities Lending as Risks Ex-
posed, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/
29/us-shortselling-sec-idUSTRE58S4EX20090929 ("Short selling ... is when
an investor borrows stock and sells it in the hope that its price will fall. If the
price does drop, the seller profits by buying the stock back at the lower
price.").
66. See Schapiro, supra note 65.
67. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING, SECURITIES LENDING WITH CASH COLLAT-
ERAI. REINVESTMENT IN RETIREMENT PLANS: WITHDRAWAL RESTRICTIONS AND
RiSK RAISE CONCERNS (Comm. Print Mar. 2011). See also JPMorgan Asset
Management, Securities Lending Outlook: Managing Value Generation and Risk,
RESERVE MAN. Q. (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/
General/SecuritiesLendingOutlook Managing-.ValueGeneration and_
Risk/1159389927646. Worse yet, the declines caused institutional investors
to shy away from lending out their portfolios; to fill the void, securities bor-
rowers have begun to solicit retail investors, who are far less savvy and able to
mitigate risk, to be lenders of securities. See Nina Mehta, FNRA Looks to Pro-
tect Retail Investors Who Lend Stock, TRADERS MAG. ONLINE NEWS (Sept. 30,
2009), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/finra-retailization-securities-
lending-10441 1-1.html?zkPrintable=true.
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ers' securities portfolios. Banks are involved in securities lend-
ing in two capacities: as lending agents or as custodians. Lend-
ing agents hold and reinvest the cash collateral provided by
securities borrowers to securities lenders, 8 while custodians
hold and move securities portfolios on behalf of their clients.69
Both services are permissible tied products under the Pro-
posed Interpretation. 70 Lending agents limit their exposure
contractually so that the securities lender bears all the market
risk for the investment of collateral while the lending agent
shares in the upside by splitting profits with the securities
lender.7' Despite these risks and limitations, when tied to bank
credit, securities lending poses a temptation for customers to
fund borrowing costs by loaning out their securities and invest-
ing the cash collateral. This temptation was especially perni-
cious in the heyday of high returns just before 2008.
3. Implications
The emergence of products whose values are subject to
tremendous fluctuation as permissible ties to bank loans re-
flects a willingness of regulators to stretch the notion of "tradi-
tional bank products" far beyond the originally enumerated
exceptions of deposits and trust services, which tend to be
more stable. With these expansions, the statutory exemption
has moved into the realm of investments-notably, invest-
ments that subject bank customers to higher degrees of risk.
The risk is often hidden in the complexity of the products. As
compared to, say, asset management or cash management,
where the risks are straightforward, it can be much more diffi-
cult to discern from all the technical details that swaps and
securities lending expose borrowers to market risk. These
products also entail other types of risks, such as credit and
counterparty risk.72
68. ANoREw L. GAINES, PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS OF 2012: SECURITIES
LENDING, 980 PLI/TAx 611 (2012).
69. Diana Chan et at., The Securities Custody Industry, European Central
Bank Occasional Paper Series No. 68 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.
ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecocp68.pdf.
70. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52030.
71. J. D'Angelo Fellmeth, Internal Government Review Agencies, 15 CAL.
REG. L. REiP. 22, 23 (Fall 1995).
72. See infra Part III.B.1.
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Even if the utility of OTC derivatives and securities lend-
ing is conceded, supporters of an expansive reading of permis-
sible ties must contend with the problem that the enactment
of the Anti-Tying Provision predates many of these instru-
ments.73 Those in the camp of pulling back the bank tying re-
strictions, therefore, had to stretch the exceptions to make way
for novel products. In the case of derivatives, the arguments
were tenuous. One commonly invoked argument is that these
products protect a bank's interest in the underlying loan by
allowing borrowers to hedge risk. Yet both the definition and
practice of "hedging" are blurry. While that term may impli-
cate risk mitigation, the real motive of counterparties entering
into swaps is that each has a bet on the position of the underly-
ing obligation-whether, for instance, interest rates will go up
or go down. 74 Characterization of OTC derivatives as "useful
hedging arrangement[s]," therefore, is perhaps too charitable
to banks.75
Nonetheless, in the flurry of comment letters which fol-
lowed the Proposed Interpretation, the banking and finance
industry urged the Federal Reserve to adopt ever more permis-
sive stances. Comment letters called for a blanket exemption
for all derivatives as traditional bank products-or at least a
finding that the combination of a loan and a derivative is a
single product, rather than two separate products.76
C. The Prevalence of Tying
Until recently, the scant empirical research done on bank
tying seemed to split on the prevalence of the practice. Two
studies undertaken by the federal government concluded that
73. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 3.
74. The JPMorgan trading loss in second quarter 2012, for example, was
supposedly a hedge. Halah Touryalai, JPMorgan's Loss Was From Prop Trading,
Not Hedging: Meredith Whitney, FORBES (June 19, 2012), available at http://
www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/19/jpmorgans-loss-was-the-
result-of-prop-trading-not-hedging-meredith-whitney/.
75. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 36.
76. See, e.g., Letter from Beth L. Climo, Exec. Dir., ABA Sec. Ass'n, to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept.
30, 2003), at 4, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2003/No-
vember/20031105/OP-1158/OP-1158_17 1.pdf [hereinafter ABASA Com-
ment Letter]. For more on the one-versus-two products debate, see infra
note 231.
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tying by banks was rare.7 7 On the other hand, the Association
of Financial Professionals ("AFP") has consistently reported in-
tense pressure on borrowers to direct additional business to
banks and their affiliates, as well as the adverse consequences
that flowed when such business was not awarded.8 Surveys
conducted by the AFP report directly challenge the conclu-
sions of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 7" The AFP's
comprehensive surveys, which break down tied products into
categories, are difficult to assail.8 0 By contrast, the OCC and
GAO reports rely heavily upon bank examination results and
interviews with banks, a bank-oriented perspective that does
little to factor in the input of borrowers. Bank officials are
savvy enough to negotiate loan conditions orally and then me-
morialize the terms in documentation that either does not
mention tying conditions or includes certification from bor-
rowers that they were not forced into purchasing tied prod-
ucts.8 ' Bank policies themselves are drafted with a view to pass-
ing regulatory exams; they do not shed much light on actual
lending practice.
Perhaps the most thorough examination of bank tying
practices ever conducted has come out of Europe, where a
similarly robust antitrust regime has created prominent
caselaw and reams of scholarship on transatlantic comparisons
77. E.g., OFFICE OF THE ComrrROI.Il.R OF THE CURRENCY, TODAY'S CREDIT
MARKETS, RELATIONSHIP BANKING, AND TYING (2003), http://www.occ.treas.
gov/topics/laws-regulations/TyingWhitePaper.pdf; U.S. GENERAI. AccoUNT-
INC OFFci, BANK OVERSIGHT: FEW CASES OF TYING HAVE BEEN DETECTED
(1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224118.pdf. A later study by the
GAO, however, was mixed in its conclusions-on balance, evidence of tying
was rare, but the lack of evidence may suggest reluctance on the part of
borrowers to come forward. See U.S. GENERAI. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK Tv-
ING: ADDITIONAIL STEPS NEEDED To ENSURE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TYING
PROHIBITIONS (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d044.pdf [hereinafter
GAO STUDY].
78. AFP SURVEY, supra note 6. For further details, see infra Part III.B.1.
79. See GAO STUDY, supra note 77, at 5. The GAO was renamed the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office in 2004.
80. The AFP survey does track several types of investment banking tied
products. Unfortunately, it does not single out derivatives. But see GAO
STUDY, supra note 77, at 15 n. 20 (questioning the AFP Survey's methodol-
ogy).
81. See Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5, at 209;
GAO STUDY, supra note 77, at 15.
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in competition policy. 2 At the end of 2009, the European
Commission released a 416-page report on tying practices of
European banks (the "EU Tying Report"), which corroborated
high occurrences of tying across Europe." The EU Tying Re-
port was the culmination of a two-year investigation on the re-
tail financial services sector (generally covering consumers and
small businesses), followed by another year focusing purely on
tying, cross-selling, and conditional sales.8 4 According to the
report, tying can be found in one-third of the instances of
cross-selling,85 the practice of soliciting consumers of one
product to purchase additional products. In the United States,
as in Europe, banks have stepped up cross-selling efforts to
make up for lost profits from more heavily regulated prod-
ucts. 86
The EU Tying Report's survey respondents estimated that
60 percent of financial institutions engage in tying, cross-sell-
ing, and bundling and that 80 percent of all consumers are
affected.8 7 Tying is not always harmful, as the study's authors
note. Therefore, the authors examined the practice from the
lens of anticompetitive effects, propensity for unfairness, and
82. See, e.g., MIcRosOT ON TRIAL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A
TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASE (Luca Rubini, ed., 2010).
83. See EU TYING REroRT, supra note 6. For an overview of results, see
European Commission, Consultation Document on the Study of Tying and Other
Potentially Unfair Commercial Practices in the Retail Financial Service Sector (Jan.
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/consultations/
docs/2010/tying/consultation-en.pdf.
84. See EU TYING REPORT, supra note 6, at 12, 14-15. The EU Tying Re-
port's definition of cross-selling encompasses tying and bundling, and its
definition of tying blurs into bundling. See id. at 13 ("Tying occurs when two
or more products are sold together in a package and at least one of these
products is not sold separately"). In the U.S., the narrower definition of ty-
ing makes for clearer lines of demarcation.
85. Id. at 16.
86. See David Henry & Dakin Campbell, Banks Turn to Cross-selling to Boost
Profit, Bi.OOMBERG NEWS, reprinted in SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 23,
2010, http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Banks-turn-to-cross-selling-
to-boost-profit-3260614.php ("Wells Fargo and Bank of America Corp. are
pushing their customers to buy more brokerage, savings and banking ser-
vices from them as the weak economy and new regulations make it harder to
earn money from loans and investment banking.").
87. EU TYING REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. The survey respondents were
comprised mostly of regulators and associations of financial service providers
(75 percent of respondents) and a smaller proportion of financial institu-
tions (25 percent). Id. at 15.
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the unique qualities of the retail segment."" The study con-
cludes that tying can reduce customer mobility and price
transparency, increase switching costs, and adversely affect
consumer confidence.89 The asymmetry of sophistication be-
tween consumers and financial institutions features promi-
nently in the EU Tying Study's analysis,"" leading to the con-
clusion that many desired products, when tied to something
else, can create unfairness for bank customers.9 1 In an effort
to quantify the impact of tying, the authors ran a simulation
on the effect of tying which demonstrated that without the
scrutinized practices, 572 million contracts in the 27 EU coun-
tries would have been moved away from the current financial
institutions.92
The damaging findings of the EU Tying Study might be
mitigated on two grounds. First, Europe is Europe. Antitrust
laws there do not always map neatly onto the American anti-
trust regime.93 Bank tying analysis in Europe is further distin-
guishable in that tying seems to encompass more types of sales
practices in Europe than would fall under the narrow, techni-
cal strictures of the Anti-Tying Provision. 4 Second, the EU Ty-
ing Study focuses on less sophisticated customers, whose needs
do not merit the tying of a broad menu of products. 5 Where
88. Id. at 17-20.
89. Id. at 21. The efficiencies generated by tying, including lower prices,
are factored into this analysis. Id. at 18, 36.
90. Id. at 18.
91. When mortgages are the desired product (ominously called "gateway
products" in the study), 90 percent of cross-selling practices are found to be
unfair, with the most unfair combinations involving investment accounts,
bank deposits, and insurance. Id. at 22. When consumer loans are the de-
sired product, 90.5 percent of cross-selling practices are found to be unfair.
Id. at 23.
92. Id. at 24.
93. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kurdle, Rhetoric and Reality in the
Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 423 (2005).
94. On the blurry demarcations separating tying, cross-selling, and bun-
dling in the EU, see EU TYING REPORT, supra note 6, at 13-14. European tying
analysis is also complicated by the overlay of national laws and European
regulations such as Article 82 and the Unfair Commercial Practices Direc-
tive.
95. This is not to say, of course, that tying does not occur for unsophisti-
cated borrowers. Cf FSA Finds Banks Guilty, supra note 7.
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more sophisticated-and therefore risky-tied products can
be predicted to appear is with large corporate borrowers.
In fact, research indicates that tying is more likely to oc-
cur for larger rather than smaller borrowers, especially where
the desired product is loan syndication.96 The magnitude of
credit involved in syndications is so large that only a small pool
of banks can serve as the lead arrangers. It is slightly counter-
intuitive, but credit is more powerful as leverage with large
and sophisticated borrowers than with retail consumers.
It would seem that the consumers and small businesses,
which the EU Tying Study is most concerned about tend not
to be targets for cross-selling of swaps and securities lending.
These customers would not own the diversified securities port-
folios to lend to hedge funds for short selling; nor would they
be likely to take out variable-rate loans at figures high enough
to justify hedging. We do know, however, that banks are begin-
ning to converge upon less sophisticated clientele as competi-
tion increases 97-and tying is the vehicle with which to do so.
On the subject of aggressively pushing tied products upon
credit customers, the research on derivatives is most robust.
Derivatives trading generates such large revenues that both
large and small banks have crowded into the market.98 In the
last decade, as this market became more competitive, banks
began to do OTC derivatives deals "with not only the largest
and most sophisticated financial institutions, but also with
their smaller and less creditworthy borrowers."99 When the LI-
BOR scandal broke in June 2012, it was revealed that poten-
tially tens of thousands of interest rate swaps pegged to LIBOR
had been bundled with loans'00 and sold to small- and me-
dium-sized businesses that had not understood nor been in-
formed of the risks.10' Borrowers were a natural pool to be
tapped, since banks have several times more borrowers as
96. See AFP SURVEY, supra note 6; infra Part III.B.1.
97. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 15-16.
98. Id. at 15. For fourth-quarter 2011, commercial banks reported deriva-
tives trading revenues of $2.5 billion. OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2011 REPORT,
supra note 57.
99. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 15-16.
100. Lindsay Fortado & Ben Moshinsky, Barclays, BBS Will Compensate Cli-
ents Mis-Sold Derivatives, BLOOMBERG NEWs, reprinted in SAN FRANCISCO CHRON-
ICLE, June 29, 2012
101. See Thompson & Masters, supra note 64.
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credit clients than as derivatives counterparties.10 2 In a 2001
study, Christian Johnson noted that out of 200 different multi-
lender loan transactions, more than 180 had loan documenta-
tion that featured integrated provisions relating to borrowers'
derivatives activities, and 62 contained covenants requiring
borrowers to enter into OTC derivatives. 0 -
III.
USING THE ANTI-TYING PROVISION TO SEQUESTER RISK
Given the risks associated with the backpedaling on anti-
tying protections by the Federal Reserve since the 1990s, this
Article advocates taking a different course by strengthening
the Anti-Tying Provision and using it as a buffer against finan-
cial risk. This Part begins by exploring the contours of what
that policy would look like.
This Part then responds to potential criticisms that bor-
rowers do not need the Anti-Tying Provision's protections and
that the law is an inappropriate means to curtail financial risk.
A. Modifications to the Current Approach
Two modifications to the Anti-Tying Provision can help
keep risky financial products from penetrating broad swathes
of the economy. The first is a slower, more deliberate ap-
proach to the expansion of "traditional bank products," which
subjects products to an overall assessment of risk. The second
is to dispense with a showing of coercion in tying claims.
1. Slowing the Expansion of "Traditional Bank Products"
This Article urges the Federal Reserve to consider the full
panoply of risks when it evaluates "new" traditional bank prod-
ucts and illustrate publicly how the agency has accounted for
those risks. Going forward, thorough assessments of risk would
likely mean that the traditional bank products list will be ex-
panded more slowly. Traditional bank products are defined by
either statute or regulation; 0 yet, because the statutory lan-
guage of the Anti-Tying Provision is so specific, most tradi-
tional products have been enumerated by the regulation or
102. Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 16.
103. See id. at 16, 18.
104. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52030.
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order of the Federal Reserve."o5 As the agency considers future
exceptions, it should incorporate the more nuanced under-
standing of risk gained by industry and regulators in recent
years.' 0 6
A slower pace to the expansion of traditional bank prod-
ucts is especially critical for products with a significant invest-
ment component. The appearance of derivatives, securities
lending, and asset management on the list of defined tradi-
tional bank products in 2003 reveals the Federal Reserve's in-
clination to allow commercial banks to move into the invest-
ment space via tying. Investment products entail more risk
than most of the other products on the Proposed Interpreta-
tion list. Derivatives and securities lending present particular
challenges to borrowers, as the complexity of these instru-
ments may obscure their risks. 0 7 While it is true that some tied
products on the list have a small investment component-for
example, trust services-those products are more easily under-
stood by borrowers. Further, the providers of those services are
often bound by fiduciary duty to the client, a separate layer of
accountability that places the client's interests above anyone
else's. 08
The Federal Reserve's analysis should not be limited to
market risk. While market risk might be especially salient for
asset management and securities lending, some products fea-
ture other types of risk more prominently. For example, deriv-
atives implicate credit risk (the risk that a counterparty will fail
to honor its contractual obligations),' 09 liquidity risk (the risk
that a party cannot transact without extraordinary loss due to
105. Compare the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (A) (2006) ("loan, dis-
count, deposit, or trust service") with the list in the Proposed Interpretation,
supra note 11, at 52030.
106. On the more sophisticated understanding of risk, see Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. Rv. 657 (2012); Paul Saltzman et al., A Spirited Conversation
Assessing the Risks and Benefits of Big Banks, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2012);
Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L.
REv. 779 (2011).
107. See supra Part II.B.3.
108. With trust services, fiduciaries are compelled to diversify investments
so as to mitigate risk from market fluctuations. For more, see infra Part
III.B.3.
109. Feder, supra note 37, at 689, 722. Credit risk can be broken down
into counterparty risk (the risk of insolvency of a counterparty) and settle-
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lack of resources or prospects),' Io and operational risk (the
risk that a party's internal systems will fail to measure, monitor,
or control that party's exposure to risk).' ' Finally, there is sys-
temic risk. Systemic risk has been defined as "the risk that the
whole financial system will collapse because of the initial fail-
ure of just one or a few players"' 12 and "[t]he risk that a de-
fault by one market participant will have repercussions on
other participants due to the interlocking nature of financial
markets."" 3 The role of derivatives in the financial crisis
reveals how quickly these instruments can threaten the stabil-
ity of the global financial system. 1 14
These risks vary on a product-by-product basis and may
exist in different proportions in different products. Interest
rate swaps, for instance, may implicate market risk to a greater
extent because these instruments can create so much damage
with wild interest rate fluctuations or consistent out-of-the-
money positions. In contrast, credit derivatives may implicate
credit and systemic risks more. Whatever combination these
risks exist in, all of them should be considered by the Federal
Reserve, and the agency should indicate in future releases, ex-
emptive orders, and interpretations how it has evaluated these
risks. In this way, the agency will at least provide some assur-
ment risk (the risk that a counterparty will fail to reciprocate after one party
has discharged its obligations). Id. at 722-25.
110. Id. at 725. Liquidity risk, too, can be broken down into two types:
funding liquidity risk (the risk that a party cannot meet payment obligations
due to cash shortage) and market liquidity risk (the risk that a party cannot
terminate a transaction prior to maturity). Id. at 726-27.
111. Id. at 727.
112. Id. at 729.
113. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 197 (2008) (citing
CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMoorrY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, CFTC GLOSSARY,
http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary/glossary-s.html). An elegant
working definition is "the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses
to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market
price volatility." Id. at 204.
114. Dodd-Frank's suggestion to centralize clearing in a handful of
counterparties, however, may actually increase systemic risk. See Kristin J.
Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOK.
L. REV. 681 (2012).
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ance that it has mapped out all the different effects of "new"
traditional bank products upon borrowers.
Finally, the application of a risk-based approach to bank
tying restrictions should spell an end to the tying of derivatives
and securities lending services to loans. To date, the Federal
Reserve has not issued final interpretations to follow the 2003
Proposed Interpretation. If the agency ever follows up with fi-
nal interpretations, then derivatives and securities lending ser-
vices should be removed from the list of traditional bank prod-
ucts. Otherwise, the Federal Reserve should issue an order
clarifying that these products are not to be tied to loans or
other financial products. This change would correct a position
that, in retrospect, injects far too many dimensions of risk into
an otherwise straightforward purchase of credit.
2. Clarifying the Requirement of Coercion
One longstanding debate surrounding the Anti-Tying
Provision has been whether the law requires a showing of ac-
tual coercion by a bank upon its customer to purchase the tied
product. Taking a bank-friendly stance, the Proposed Interpre-
tation asserts that a tie must be imposed or forced upon the
customer to violate the Anti-Tying Provision." 5 The Federal
Reserve arrived at this conclusion by examining legislative his-
tory and by analogy to the general tying prohibitions, which do
require coercive imposition. 16The contrary position, that co-
ercion is not a necessary element, is the better approach-it
finds support in the policy underlying the rule and recent case
law. This is also the better position if we are to adopt the Anti-
Tying Provision as a proactive check on risky financial prod-
ucts.
Legislative history on the requirement of coercion is
mixed. On one hand, the Conference Report, which ex-
plained the differences between the House and Senate ver-
sions of the bill adopting the Anti-Tying Provision, seemed to
115. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52028.
116. See id. (citing Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566,
1577-78 (11th Cir. 1991); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co. of Ga.,
815 F.2d 1407, 1415, 1418-19 (11th Cir. 1987); Unijax, Inc. v. Champion
Int'l, Inc., 683 F.2d 678, 685 (2d Cir. 1982); Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. Am. Mo-
tors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); H.R. REP. No.
1747 (Conf. Rep.)), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5561, 5569 [hereinafter
CONFERENCE REPORT].
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view both coercive and voluntary ties as contrary to the Anti-
Tying Provision.' " The report described ties as resulting ei-
ther from "actual coercion by a seller or from a customer's
realization that he stands a better chance of securing a scarce
and important commodity (such as credit) by 'volunteering' to
accept other products or services." I" Shortly after that obser-
vation, however, the report describes the Anti-Tying Provision
as "largely prevent [ing] coercive tie-ins,"' 19 a line that was not
lost on the Federal Reserve.12( The agency cited this and other
pieces of legislative history that strongly suggested that the law
was meant to protect borrowers from coercive rather than vol-
untary ties.121
In concluding the above discussion, the Conference Re-
port does not endorse any staunch view on voluntary versus
coercive tying, other than the Federal Reserve's case-by-case
determination on the appropriateness of regulation.'12 There-
fore, it would be a stretch to cite the Conference Report as
unequivocal support for either stance.'12 Nevertheless, the
117. Naegele, too, notes that a requirement of coercion is inappropriate.
See Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5, at 204 ("Any
requirement of coercion is inconsistent with and more stringent than what
Congress intended; voluntary as well as coercive ties violate the anti-tying
provision.").
118. CONFERENCE REroRT, supra note 116, at 5569.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52029 n.34.
121. See id. (citing CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 5569; 116 Cong.
Rec. S20647 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1970) (violation of section 106 occurs
"where the totality of the circumstances indicates that the customer has not
voluntarily entered into the transaction, but rather has been induced into
doing so through coercion") (statement of Sen. Brooke); 116 Cong. Rec.
S15709 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1970)).
122. See CONFERENCE REPoRT, supra note 116, at 5569, which reads, in part:
But the dangers of 'voluntary' tie-ins and reciprocity are basically
structural and must be dealt with by the Board in determining the
competitive effects of bank holding company expansion into fields
closely related to banking . .. These will be difficult questions, for
assurances of good faith and the intention not to engage in tie-ins
and reciprocity by the applicant bank holding companies will
largely be irrelevant to the just as serious dangers of 'voluntary' tie-
ins and reciprocity. The Board, must, in any case, consider these
problems in carrying out its responsibilities under the Act.
123. Cf Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52029 n.35 (citing CON-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 5569 for the proposition that
"[a]lthough the statute's legislative history characterizes this type of volun-
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Proposed Interpretation pointed to legislative history in its as-
sertion that to run afoul of the Anti-Tying Provision, a bank
must force or coerce its customer to obtain the tied prod-
uct.'2 4
This debate has also played out in the courts, most promi-
nently between the Fifth Circuit in the 1990 case Dibidale of
Louisiana, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Company'25 and the
Eleventh Circuit in the 1993 case Integon Life Insurance Corp. v.
Browning.'26 In Dibidale, the majority opinion noted that the
Anti-Tying Provision provides no clear guidance on whether
the statutory phrase "condition or requirement" implicitly
means coercion.127 However, the majority goes on to say that
analogy to general tying prohibitions under the Sherman and
Clayton acts is imprecise because, among other reasons, "the
unique nature of the banking industry renders it more impor-
tant to prohibit conditional transactions in that context than
in other less sensitive sectors of the economy."1 28 Congress rec-
ognized that transactions involving credit were inherently an-
ticompetitive, since banks dominate control over credit, so
Congress chose to impose more stringent anti-tying regula-
tions under the Bank Holding Company Act than under the
Sherman and Clayton acts.' 29 Hence, the majority concluded
that restricting the Anti-Tying Provision to tying arrangements
where a borrower "is literally forced to purchase or provide a
tied product . . . would vitiate that section's intended role"
since Congress recognized that "a tying arrangement may
squelch competition whether coercive or not."'s 0
tary tying as generally being undesirable, it also explicitly states that such
voluntary tying is not prohibited by section 106").
124. See id. at n.35 ("After carefully reviewing the language, legislative his-
tory and purposes of the statute, the Board believes the better interpretation
of section 106 is that a violation may exist only if a bank forces or coerces a
customer to obtain (or provide) the tied product as a condition to obtaining
the customer's desired product.").
125. 916 F.2d 300, 304-07 (5th Cir. 1990).
126. 989 F.2d 1143, 1149, 1149-52 (11th Cir. 1993).
127. Dibidale, 916 F.2d at 305.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 305-06.
130. Id. at 306 (citing, not surprisingly, the CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 116, at 5569). The majority opinion in Dibidale was followed by a dissent
that read the language of "condition or requirement" in the statute to mean
something essential to the loan, rather than voluntary actions undertaken by
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Three years after Dibidale, the Eleventh Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion in Integon Life Insurance Corp. In that
case, the court considered an action under the Home Owners'
Loan Act, which regulates federal savings and loans associa-
tions (also known as "thrifts").' 3 1 This act had adopted anti-
tying language nearly identical to the Anti-Tying Provision. In
its attempt to elucidate the meaning of the operative phrase
"an association shall not in any manner extend credit ... on
the condition or requirement," 3 2 the court turned to general
tying cases.13 3 In those contexts, general tying prohibitions re-
quired a showing that the purchaser was forced to buy the tied
product. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, to es-
tablish a tying violation under the Home Owners' Loan Act, a
claimant "must prove that the thrift forced or coerced the
plaintiff into purchasing the tied product." 34 This, the court
realized, was in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit in
Dibidale.'35
The Federal Reserve has acknowledged Dibidale but sided
instead with the approach of Integon.13 6 Days after the promul-
gation of the Proposed Interpretation, however, the Sixth Cir-
cuit decided Highland Capital, Inc. v. Franklin National Bank,
which exacerbated the circuit split by opting for a middle road
between actual evidence and presumption of coercion.'37 The
court also echoed the Fifth Circuit's sense that an emphasis on
coercion creates a requirement not contained in the statute.' 3 8
borrowers to improve their chances of securing a loan. See id. at 308-09
(Jones, J., dissenting).
131. Integon, 989 F.2d at 1149-50. The HomeOwners' Loan Act is codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 et seq.; it adopted the anti-tying provisions of the Bank
Holding Company Act via an amendment in 1982. 989 F.2d. at 1150.
132. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (1) (2011).
133. Those cases involved the claims of a ticket-selling service against a
promoter and computerized ticket seller, Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promo-
tions Co. of Ga., 815 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1987), a paper distributor for
medical electronic equipment against a paper and electronics manufacturer,
T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Electronics, Inc., 931 F.2d 816
(11th Cir. 1991), and a supplier of automobile air conditioners against Volk-
swagen, Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.
1977).
134. Integon, 989 F.2d at 1151.
135. Id. at 1151 n.20.
136. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at n.36.
137. See 350 F.3d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 2003)
138. See id.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
2013] 883
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
In Highland Capital, the plaintiff pointed to circumstantial evi-
dence that fell short of establishing coercion by the lender.'39
In weighing the contradictory approaches under Dibidale and
Integon, the court concluded that violation of the Anti-Tying
Provision is established by "proof that a bank conveyed an in-
tention to withhold credit unless the borrower fulfilled a 'pre-
requisite' of purchasing or furnishing some other product or
service."1 40 A borrower may well assent to a tying condition
without force or involuntary submission; essential to a tying
claim, however, is that the tied product is a "condition that must
be fulfilled before the bank will agree to extend credit."141
While the Sixth Circuit in Highland Capital declined to
adopt the majority view in Dibidale, it nevertheless believed that
a requirement of coercion is beyond the statute.142 This ap-
proach is notable not only in signaling that the Fifth Circuit
was no longer an outlier in its willingness to presume rather
than require evidence of actual coercion, but also in reaching
a conclusion quite different from that of Integon and the Fed-
eral Reserve. Coincidentally, Highland Capital was argued less
than two weeks after the Proposed Interpretation was pub-
lished and decided nearly three months afterward. 43
A few other sources on the Anti-Tying Provision do not
include coercion as an element that must be proven by the
claimant.144 Some believe coercion should be proven, while
others do not, but authority is simply too split for the issue to
be considered settled.
As a matter of policy, a showing of coercion should not be
required upon claimants. The primary concern animating the
Anti-Tying Provision was that the complete dominance by
banks over one sector of the economy-credit-justifies a
more extreme rule to prevent their leverage of that domi-
139. See id. at 566.
140. Id. at 567.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. The opinion does not mention the Proposed Interpretation, supra
note 11.
144. See, e.g., Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5; 4A
FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAwYERs EDITION § 8:17 (2012) ("A plaintiff need not
make any showing of coercion and need not establish the market share that
a defendant possesses to establish unlawful tying.") (citing S&N Equip. Co. v.
Casa Grande Cotton Fin. Co., 97 F.3d 337, 346 n.18 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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nance to foist products and services upon consumers. Hence,
several prongs critical to tying inquiries under the Sherman
and Clayton acts were read out of tying inquiries under the
Bank Holding Company Act-specifically, that the seller has
sufficient power in the tying market, that the tie has anticom-
petitive effects, and that the tie affects a substantial amount of
interstate commerce. 14 5 Coercion should also be excluded.
The market power of banks over credit was presumed by the
drafters of the Anti-Tying Provision. The result of that pre-
sumption should be that coercion is inherent in bank domi-
nance over credit and, as such, should not be a burden thrust
upon the claimant to prove. So long as a claimant can show
the requirement to purchase a tied product, the coercion ele-
ment should be deemed satisfied.
Not requiring claimants to show coercion helps tying
claims go forward. Due to oral negotiations on lending, evi-
dence of tying is difficult to obtain.146 When regulators and
borrowers must prove coercion, their evidentiary hurdles are
heightened even more. If the current circuit split is resolved in
favor of Dibidale or even Highland Capital, it would help regula-
tors and borrowers deter problematic tying.
B. Borrowers as Proxies for Consumers
The above recommendations do not protect all sectors of
the economy from financial risk, just customers and potential
customers of commercial banks. The merit of this framework,
therefore, rests upon the assumption that protection of com-
mercial borrowers furthers the interests of the economy as a
whole.
One inevitable criticism is that commercial borrowers are
often as sophisticated as investment banking customers and do
not need to be treated with regulatory paternalism. Another
question is whether borrowers comprise a large enough cross-
section of consumers to make stronger tying restrictions mean-
ingful. Finally, skeptics might charge that the Anti-Tying Provi-
sion should not function as a constraint on financial risk be-
cause individual tied products are already regulated directly by
145. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52027; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 30, at 5558, 5547.
146. See Naegele, Anti-Tying Provision: 35 Years Later, supra note 5, at 209-
10.
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existing law. This section addresses those potential criticisms
in turn.
1. Conflating Borrowers with Vulnerability?
The use of a stronger Anti-Tying Provision to preempt
wide-scale introduction of risky financial products may invite
charges of conflating borrowers with vulnerability. Admittedly,
borrowers can be large and sophisticated entities. Syndicated
loan deals, for example, where numerous banks pool together
to lend to a large debtor, can reach hundreds of millions of
dollars l47-as much money as raised by investment banks in
the issuance of publicly traded securities. On this basis, banks
have argued that there should be a sophisticated entity exemp-
tion to the Anti-Tying Provision since, as the argument goes,
large corporate borrowers cannot possibly be coerced into
purchasing tied products. 148
Yet the sophistication-of-borrowers argument suffers from
its own empirical fallacy. Because the size and complexity of
syndications limit the number of banks able to lend, those
banks that do provide syndication services often impose tying
conditions.' 4 9 In the face of tightening credit markets and a
dwindling pool of lead banks on syndication deals, even large
corporate borrowers find that they have little choice but to ac-
quiesce to tying conditions. 5 0
In 2004, the Association of Financial Professionals con-
ducted a survey of 370 financial executives from a diverse
group of companies which had recently sought out loans (the
147. SeeJohnson, Holding Credit Hostage, supra note 5, at 174-75.
148. See, e.g., Letter from Paul Polking, Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am., to
Jennifer Johnson, Sec'y, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2003/November/20031105/OP-1158/OP-
1158_16_1.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Paul Polking to Jennifer Johnson];
Letter from John Huffstutler, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am., to Scott
Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2005/February/20050224/OP-1 158/OP-1158
55_.Lpdf [hereinafter Letter from John Huffstutler to Scott Alvarez].
149. See AFP SURvEY, supra note 6, at 6; Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage,
supra note 5, at 175, 178.
150. See AFP SURVEY, supra note 6 (reporting that large companies are
more likely to be subject to tying activity, in part because of their size and
complexity).
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"AFP Survey").' 5 1 The AFP Survey found that nearly two-thirds
of respondents from large companies had been denied credit
or experienced changes in credit terms after their company
did not give their banks additional business. The survey cor-
roborated the prevalence of tying-only 29 percent of all re-
spondents indicated that banks "rarely" or "never" offered
credit as a stand-alone product.'5 2 The responses also demon-
strated that large borrowers were particularly vulnerable to ty-
ing. Sixty-three percent of respondents from companies with
annual revenues greater than $1 billion indicated that a com-
mercial bank had denied them credit or changed credit terms
because the company did not award additional business to the
bank.'5 3 That additional business often consisted of invest-
ment banking services, such as underwriting and strategic ad-
vising. Indeed, 53 percent of all companies reported having
been denied credit or having credit terms changed after de-
clining to give investment banking business to a commercial
bank.1 54 Those banks were often unambiguous in the reasons
for denial: 29 percent of all respondents-and one-third of re-
spondents from large companies-indicated that they had
been explicitly told by bank officials that the denial or change
of credit terms came because the borrowers did not funnel
other business to the banks.' 55
Counterintuitive as it may seem, banks appear to have
more leverage with larger borrowers. Contrary arguments have
been made previously by Bank of America, as part of efforts to
create a safe harbor that would hold that large borrowers can
never be forced into accepting unwanted products, and there-
fore tying to large clients should be per se legal.516 Those argu-
ments are undermined by studies that suggest that the pool of
banks that can serve as lead arrangers in syndicated loans is
151. An earlier survey conducted in 2002 uncovered similar concerns;
though the 2004 survey was more thorough on the subject of tying. See A.ss'N
OF FIN. PROF'LS AND GEORGETOWN UNIV. CAPITAL MKTS. RESEARCH CTR., THE
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION ON AcCESS TO SHORT-TERM
CREDIT (Jan. 2002) (on file with author).
152. AFP SuRvEY, supra note 6, at 6.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 7-8.
156. See Letter from Paul Polking toJenniferJohnson, supra note 148; Let-
ter from John Huffstutler to Scott Alvarez, supra note 148.
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very small.15 7 In fact, one of the letters from Bank of America
to the Federal Reserve in 2005 stated that "[f]or a credit facil-
ity of $10 billion or more, there are at least five lenders that
could effectively lead arrange such a deal."158 It would have
been more appropriate to say that there were only five such
lenders-a number that has only decreased with the bank fail-
ures of the financial crisis.159
This Article's conception of the Anti-Tying Provision as a
buffer against risk also pits large borrowers against large banks
in another way. Because exotic financial instruments tend to
be utilized by more sophisticated consumers of credit,o60 the
Anti-Tying Provision will be at its most effective when banks
are sued for tying complex products to the credit deals of the
largest borrowers. These will also be the most controversial
cases. While it may be hard to muster sympathy for the giant
borrowers of the world, we must accept that, under stronger
tying restrictions, they should prevail more easily against banks
in tying actions to keep risk at bay.
2. The Breadth of "Borrower"
One question on a more robust Anti-Tying Provision con-
cerns how wide-ranging its effects would be. Does the law af-
fect only a sliver of the economy? If so, perhaps it is inappro-
priate for the law to be used as a tool against financial risk.
The Anti-Tying Provision touches upon borrowers and po-
tential borrowers from commercial banks. Whether as home-
owners, small businesses, or corporate behemoths, broad
swathes of the economy can interface with commercial banks
at any time as borrowers. This fact, coupled with the strategic
157. E.g., AFP SURVEY, supra note 6; see alsoJohnson, Holding Credit Hostage,
supra note 5, at 174 ("Syndicated lending has been hit particularly hard be-
cause of consolidation.").
158. Letter from John Huffstutler to Scott Alvarez, supra note 148, at 2
(emphasis added).
159. The purchase of Wachovia by Wells Fargo in 2008 reduced the num-
ber of banks whose consolidated assets were above $1 trillion to four banks.
For all borrowers, regardless of size and sophistication, choice of lenders has
diminished due to bank failures and consolidation. This trend has acceler-
ated since 2008, putting even greater pressure on borrowers to accede to
bank conditions. See AFP SURVEY, supra note 6, at 12; Johnson, Holding Credit
Hostage, supra note 5, at 174-75.
160. Two prominent examples are the mishaps of Orange County and
Procter & Gamble with derivatives. See PARTNOY, supra note 44.
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emphasis of banks on tying and cross-selling, would suggest
that the Anti-Tying Provision has the potential to affect a large
proportion of the economy.
Small businesses, for example, which comprise half of the
private sector and provide roughly half of U.S. employment,' 6 '
rely heavily upon commercial banks for financing.162 U.S. fam-
ilies, too, are saddled with debt. As of 2010, three-quarters of
American families held some sort of debt-mostly mortgage
debt, followed by installment loans, credit card balances, and
lines of credit.' 63 Loans and lines of credit to businesses and
homeowners are all governed by the Anti-Tying Provision.' 6 4
The potential for violation is as wide-ranging as the demand for
credit.
Today, the profitability of lending has been undercut by
economic and regulatory developments. Bank officials are
wedged between pressures from upper management to maxi-
mize profitability and the constraints of Dodd-Frank on some
of the most lucrative products of the past.'6 5 Yet with such a
large proportion of the economy in need of credit at any given
time, banks-which are the dominant provider of credit'16 -
will find it difficult not to tap borrowers for more profitable
products and services. Cross-marketing is the natural way to do
so, but excessive cross-marketing at some point bleeds into ty-
161. BRIAN HEADD, SMALL Bus. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL BUSINESS
AND Jous 4, fig. 1 (2010), available at archive.sba.gov/advo/research/
rs359tot.pdf.
162. See George W. Haynes & James R. Brown, An Examination of Financial
Patterns Using the Survey of Small Business Finances, in SMALL BUSINESS IN Fo-
cus: FINANCE, A COMrENDIUM OF RESEARCH BY THE SMALL BUSINrss ADMINIs-
TRATION'S OFFICE OF AnvocAcy (2009).
163. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. June 2012, at
55 tbl.11 (2012).
164. If a loan is issued by a thrift institution, the Home Owners' Loan Act
also imposes tying restrictions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (2011); Integon, 989
F.2d. at 1143.
165. E.g., Title VII of Dodd-Frank on margin and clearing for derivatives.
See Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and OTC Derivatives: The Impact of
Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives Market, 44 INT'L LAW.
1077 (2010).
166. For statistics on the consumer side, see Statistical Release, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Consumer Credit - G.19 (May 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Ctirrent/.
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ing. 67 As such, lending may be the frontier at which banks
peddle newly devised and as yet unwanted products.
3. Indirect Regulation of Risk
Finally, a more vigilant approach to the Anti-Tying Provi-
sion may encounter criticism that direct regulation of tied
products already exists. For example, established principles of
suitability and fiduciary duty bind the sellers of some invest-
ment products and services. Yet this Article argues that these
alternatives are either nascent or often riddled with loopholes.
While the Anti-Tying Provision is not a panacea, it can fill in
many of those gaps.
Prior to Dodd-Frank, broker-dealers and sellers of deriva-
tives could successfully maintain that they were not subject to
fiduciary duty, the high standard of care and loyalty that binds
investment advisers. Instead, broker-dealers were bound by the
far weaker suitability standard, which holds that products sold
to clients must be "suitable" for their needs, provided that self-
dealing is prohibited. 68 Meanwhile, derivatives dealers could
usually be touched only by claims of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion-these dealers were likely not under the compunctions of
suitability, which derives from the rules of broker-dealer self-
regulatory organizations, and they were generally not subject
to fiduciary duty either.1 69
Having lived through the failures of pursuing financial in-
stitutions on weak theories, lawmakers have learned that sell-
ers of risky financial products should not be able to hide be-
hind the sophistication of their clients. Dodd-Frank therefore
commissioned the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to undertake a study on the appropriateness of impos-
ing a fiduciary duty upon broker-dealers.170 In January 2011,
the SEC finished its study and recommended a fiduciary duty
167. On how tying is already happening on a large scale, see supra Part
II.C.
168. The problem with suitability is that it accounts for customer sophisti-
cation; it is more difficult to argue that a risky product was not suitable if the
purchaser was sophisticated than if the purchaser was unsophisticated.
169. See Frank Partnoy, The Shiing Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 421 (2001) (discussing how claims of fiduciary
duty and suitability are fraught with ambigtity).
170. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
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standard for broker-dealers that is consistent with the fiduciary
duty of investment-advisers.' 7 ' Although the principle of a uni-
form fiduciary duty enjoys broad support,172 implementation
of the study's recommendations will take time.
As for derivatives sellers, Dodd-Frank also mandated the
adoption of business conduct standards that prescribe height-
ened antifraud and suitability standards.17 3 Yet these standards
only curtail the activities of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Par-
ticipants, entities whose definitions under Dodd-Frank are sub-
ject to ambiguity.174 Also, the business conduct standards are
reserved for special clients such as governments and pension
plans.'75 Hence, our Borrower who purchases an interest rate
swap in connection with a loan would not be entitled to these
enhanced protections. Finally, these standards will unfold
under a lengthy implementation process that is subject to in-
171. U.S. SEc. & Excu. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISFRS AND BRO-
KER-DEALERS (2011). For a contrarian's take on uniform fiduciary duty, see
Edward Siedle, JP Morgan Private Bank's Watered-Down Fiduciary Standard of
Care, FORBES, May 24, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/
2012/05/24/jp-morgan-private-banks-watered-down-fiduciary-standard-of-
care/ (arguing that a uniform standard for brokers and investment advisers
will water down existing fiduciary standards).
172. Much of the broker-dealer industry suggested even before the study's
publication that it would be receptive to a uniform fiduciary standard. See
SEI ADVISOR NETWORK & THE COMM. FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, A
STRONG MAJORITY OF BROKERS AND ADvisoRs SUPPORT AND UNDERSTAND KEY
ELEMENTS OF A FIDUCIARY STANDARD (Nov. 2009), http://www.seic.com/Advi-
sors/SEI AdvisorNetworkFiduciaryStandardReport.pdf.
173. Dodd-Frank § 731; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Business
Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterpar-
ties; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80638 (Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 23, 155); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Business Conduct Standards for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Release
No. 34-64766, 76 Fed. Reg. 42396 (July 18, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240). Some have argued that the business conduct standards are tanta-
mount to fiduciary duty. See Letter from SIFMA and ISDA to David A.
Stawick, Sec'y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Feb. 17, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/connents/df-title-vii/swap/swap-47.pdf.
174. See William F. Kroener III, Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Its Impact
on the Banking Industry, SS038 ALI-ABA 247 (2010) (discussing ambiguities in
the carve-out for hedging and in the applicability to oil producers).
175. Dodd-Frank § 764(a).
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dustry pressure. Already the rules have garnered charges of be-
ing watered down from how they were originally conceived.' 7 6
The counterargument that direct regulation of tied prod-
ucts is sufficient, then, falls short of the mark. The Anti-Tying
Provision could fill some of the unregulated space in the loop-
holes of the business conduct standards, as well as the outer
valences of the fiduciary duty of broker-dealers before they are
fully teased out. The investment products sold by broker-
dealer affiliates and derivatives divisions would not be able to
tag along to credit unless they are voluntarily obtained by bor-
rowers. The fewer the exceptions to the Anti-Tying Provision,
the more it will be able to step in where existing law cannot.
IV.
THE RETURN OF GLASS-STEAGALL
The effect of adopting the recommendations herein-a
slower pace to expanding traditional bank product exceptions
and a clarification that borrowers need not show actual coer-
cion-would be to sequester risk by walling off certain prod-
ucts and services from credit. This approach is similar to that
of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 ("Glass-Steagall"),' 77 which
separated commercial banking from investment banking, so as
to prevent deposits from being used to play the stock market.
In the same spirit, the Anti-Tying Provision would insert a fire-
wall between borrowing and investment activity so that custom-
ers are not forced to take on additional risk when they seek
out loans.17 8
This Part casts the Anti-Tying Provision as a continuation
of the principles espoused in Glass-Steagall. It begins with a
primer on Glass-Steagall, linking it to the Volcker Rule in
Dodd-Frank, which bans proprietary trading. This Part then
discusses the advantages that stronger tying restrictions possess
176. See Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, President and CEO, and Stephen
W. Hall, Sec. Specialist, Better Markets, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y,
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-25-11/s72511-11.pdf (arguing that the rules fail to adopt sufficient
disclosure obligations and a best interest standard).
177. Also known as the Banking Act of 1933.
178. The firewall is not failsafe, of course. Because the tying restrictions
no longer apply to bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries,
see 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (Feb. 28, 1997), these entities in theory have the incen-
tive to tie credit to their products.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
892 [Vol. 9:851
BANK ANTI-TYING PROVISION
over the Volcker Rule in maintaining the firewall between
commercial banking and excessive risk.
A. Recapitulation in the Volcker Rule
Numerous commentators have remarked on the uncanny
similarities between pre-2008 bank speculation in derivatives
and pre-1929 bank speculation in securities."'7 Prior to the en-
actment of Glass-Steagall in 1933, the lines between commer-
cial and investment banks were blurred. 0 Many commercial
banks had engaged in securities activities either directly or
through affiliates.' 8' After the Great Depression, Congress
passed the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial
banks from dabbling in investment banking activities.18 2
Driving Glass-Steagall was the view that commercial banks
had been too intertwined with the stock market through trad-
ing and ownership of securities, so when the market collapsed,
commercial banks toppled as well.'8 3 In passing the act, Con-
gress sought to prevent commercial banks from imprudently
investing their own assets in stock and from making loans to
customers with the expectation that the customers would
purchase stock from the underwriter affiliates of the lending
banks.184
The vitality of Glass-Steagall ebbed and flowed through
the next six decades. Gradually, however, the Federal Reserve
liberalized the law's restrictions.8 5 In 1999, Congress passed
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("Gramm-Leach-Bliley"), which
179. See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scape-
goats ... and Scofflaws? (Tulane Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 12-14, 2012), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=2101109.
180. Commercial banks take in deposits and issue loans, while investment
banks raise money for clients-primarily corporate and government cli-
ents-through the issuance of stock and debt, advise companies on mergers
and acquisitions, and provide investment advisory services.
181. Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage, supra note 5, at 162.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 164; 2 JERRY MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 167-68 (2001).
184. Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage, supra note 5, at 164-65.
185. An oft-cited example is the 1998 order by the Federal Reserve permit-
ting Travelers Group's acquisition of Citicorp, including Citibank, while re-
taining Travelers' insurance underwriting functions and the investment
banking activities of its subsidiary Salomon Smith Barney. See FED. RESERVE
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eviscerated Glass-Steagall's most powerful provisions.18 6 Com-
mercial banks, whose primary activities consisted of taking de-
posits and issuing loans, could now be affiliated with entities
engaged in nonbank activities, such as insurance, underwrit-
ing, and investment advising. Banking organizations could
again sell their clients both credit and investment banking ser-
vices.'8 7
Gramm-Leach-Bliley might have dismantled Glass-Stea-
gall, but the philosophy of delineating deposit-taking activity
from investment activity has been resuscitated by the adoption
of the Volcker Rule in Dodd-Frank. 88 The Volcker Rule holds
that banks that take in deposits should be prohibited from
proprietary trading (i.e., trading in the bank's own account,
rather than on behalf of customers) and from owning hedge
funds and private equity vehicles.18 9 Conceived by former Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, the rule was designed to
bar banks from making speculative investments. Upon imple-
mentation, the rule would mimic the effect of Glass-Steagall by
deterring large bank holding companies from owning both de-
posit-taking and certain investment arms.i1 0
B. The Anti-Tying Provision as Firewall
Bolstering the Anti-Tying Provision would have the effect
of delimiting borrowing and risky investment activity. As they
stand, the traditional bank products consist primarily of staid
products, such as extensions of credit, deposit accounts, pay-
SYS., ORDER APPROVING FORMATION OF A BANK HOLDING COMPANY AND No-
TICE To ENGAGE IN NONBANKING AcTIVITIES (Sept. 23, 1998).
186. This included the repeal of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall, which pro-
hibited banks from affiliating with any company that "engaged principally in
the issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale or distribution" of securities.
Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, I HARV.
Bus. L. REV. 1 (2011). Coincidentally, Gramm-Leach-Bliley was passed one
year before the Commodities Futures Modernization Act, often blamed for
ushering in a freewheeling derivatives market. See id.
187. See AFP SURVEY, supra note 6, at 4.
188. See Dombalagian, supra note 179.
189. 12 U.S.C. § 1851. For a concise summary, see also Dombalagian,
supra note 179, at 11-12.
190. Steven M. Davidoff, Under Volcker, Old Dividing Line in Banks May Re-
turn, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 12, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/02/21/under-volcker-old-dividing-line-in-banks-may-return/?ref=busi-
ness.
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ment and settlement services, and payroll services.' 9 ' Classic
investment banking services, such as securities underwriting
and strategic advisory services, are forbidden as tied prod-
ucts.'9 2 The Anti-Tying Provision, therefore, already works to
preserve the demarcation between lending and investment
banking, prohibiting the tying of the latter to consumers of
the former.'9 3 This Article approaches the Anti-Tying Provi-
sion from the consumer's perspective, as a limit on how much
borrowing can mix with investing.
Strengthening the Anti-Tying Provision is an extension of
the philosophy behind the firewalls in Glass-Steagall and the
Volcker Rule. That is, products with a significant investment
component should be offered as standalone products rather
than pushed upon consumers of credit. As proposed in this
Article, the way to shore up the Anti-Tying Provision is to
transform its demarcation between desired and tied products
into a firewall between borrowing and risky investment prod-
ucts. This also maps onto Glass-Steagall's firewall (Figure 4). At
its heart, Glass-Steagall was animated by the notion that a fi-
nancial institution should not mix extensions of credit, which
tend to be low-risk, with investment banking activity, which
tends to be high-risk.194 Extrapolating that principle of com-
parative risk, the Anti-Tying Provision might be interpreted as
a law that seeks to limit the exposure of borrowers to products
and services that entail greater risk than loans.
191. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52030.
192. See id. at 52031.
193. One critical distinction is that the legality of tying turns on the tied
product. The Anti-Tying Provision prohibits the tying of securities underwrit-
ing to lending, where a loan is the desired product and securities underwrit-
ing is the tied product. However, the tying of credit to securities underwrit-
ing, where securities underwriting is the desired product and a loan is the
tied product, is acceptable.
194. But seeJohnson, Holding Credit Hostage, supra note 5, at 158 ("Large
money center commercial banks have been particularly interested in under-
writing securities, believing this work to be more profitable and less risky
than traditional lending."). That sentiment is debatable; not all underwriting
is low-risk.
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FIGURE 4. ANTI-TYING PROVISION AS FIREWALL
The two products that have been singled out in this Arti-
cle-derivatives and securities lending-are far from being
staid bank products. While they are certainly not investment
banking products, they are nevertheless investment products
that carry complex risks to borrowers. For derivatives in partic-
ular, the risks are redolent of the dangers targeted by Glass-
Steagall and the Volcker Rule in two broad ways.
First, by selling interest rate and credit default swaps,
banks in essence act as distributors of swaps. This approxi-
mates the role of underwriters in the distribution of securi-
ties.' 95 The coexistence of lending and underwriting in one
banking entity would have run counter to the principles of
Glass-Steagall, which viewed this pairing skeptically.
Concomitantly, the sale of derivatives implicates some of
the risks of proprietary trading, including systemic risk.' 6 As
privately negotiated instruments, OTC swaps are beyond the
scrutiny of anyone except the counterparties. 9 7 Yet because of
the custom of swaps sellers of "hedging" their risk by buying
offsetting swaps, a web of connectivity links multiple parties on
any given swap, two counterparties at a time, without any party
having full knowledge of the identities of all parties involved.
If more borrowers are unnecessarily shunted to swaps via tying,
then the larger that web will be and the greater the risk that
195. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating
Securities Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 33042
(2011) (analogizing the sale of derivatives by some swaps dealers to the sale
of securities by underwriters).
196. Dombalagian lists those risks as moral hazard, conflicts of interest,
and market-destabilizing activity (systemic risk). See Dombalagian, supra note
179, at 6-11.
197. Even the counterparties themselves occasionally have difficulty in val-
uing the payments and default remedies.
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failure of one institution will threaten the stability of the entire
financial system.' 98
If adopted, the recommendations in this Article would
mitigate the above concerns by installing a barrier between
borrowing and certain investment products. The barrier would
not be impossibly high, since borrowers could voluntarily opt
to buy derivatives and other products. Borrowers just cannot
be required to do so in order to obtain a loan or a loan at a
certain rate. A more unbending prohibition on tying would
reduce the instances of borrowers having to purchase tied
products; with that reduction, systemic risk would also be di-
aled down.
C. The Anti-Tying Provision's Advantages over the Volcker Rule
In the aftermath of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the Volcker Rule
will be the vehicle by which risk is separated from lending and
deposit-taking activities.'I" Yet implementation of the Volcker
Rule is fraught with technicalities. Where it applies, the Anti-
Tying Provision may be a simpler alternative to carrying out
the goals of the Volcker Rule.
The advantages offered by the Anti-Tying Provision are in
recordkeeping and enforcement. Implementation of the
Volcker Rule requires bank trading desks to keep reams of
daily records that regulators must sift through to determine
whether violations have occurred. By sheer volume alone,
these records are prone to obfuscation, hiding the true nature
of trading activity even as banks claim dutiful compliance to
the law.200 Further, banks can skirt the Volcker Rule by regula-
tory arbitrage if they shift trading activity to the affiliate that is
198. With Dodd-Frank's push toward central clearing of OTC derivatives,
a handful of clearing entities would serve as the intermediaries between all
counterparties. Yet the risk of default on all contracts has simply been
shifted to those clearing entities. Systemic risk remains; only its contours
have changed. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REv.
1019, 1063 (2012).
199. Revival of Glass-Steagall, though fashionable now, is unlikely. SeeTom
Braithwaite & Shahien Nasi ripour, Ex-Citi Chief Weill Urges Bank Break-up, FIN.
TImns (July 25, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/feaa9cfo-d65f-1 el-
ba6-00144feabdcO.html#axzz248hej8n3.
200. Dombalagian, supra note 179, at 22-25.
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overseen by the weakest regulator.20 Coordination among a
plethora of regulators also poses a problem for effective en-
forcement of the Volcker Rule, as the Federal Reserve, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission all share jurisdiction over proprietary trading.
The Anti-Tying Provision does not suffer from the same
difficulties. Enforcement entails fewer regulators (generally,
just the applicable bank regulator). In addition, its metrics are
not so highly quantitative as to require regulators to pore over
logs of daily trading activity. The law's problems with detection
and enforcement 212 are mitigated somewhat because borrow-
ers can step in as plaintiffs when regulators fail to detect or
prosecute violations. 203 By virtue of the private right of action,
the Anti-Tying Provision has an additional set of checks against
tying violations: borrower-claimants. Borrowers, who are just as
intimately knowledgeable about lending transactions as their
banks, can produce the evidence that regulators are unable to
cull. The incentive of borrowers to come forward under the
Anti-Tying Provision is that, as in general antitrust cases, suc-
cessful claimants are entitled to treble damages.204
V.
ANALOGIES FROM ANTITRUST
As a law borne of antitrust principles,205 the Anti-Tying
Provision is sensitive to the changes in tying restrictions under
the Sherman and Clayton acts. Major developments in general
anti-tying caselaw or theory cannot go unnoticed in the inter-
pretation of the Anti-Tying Provision. This is not to say that the
Anti-Tying Provision is so closely calibrated to the Sherman
201. Id. at 27-28.
202. See supra text accompanying note 81.
203. This presumes that borrowers understand when tying violations oc-
cur and that they are not loathe to file private actions.
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (2006). The disincentive to bring suit, however, is
the fear of jeopardizing relationships with lenders. As of now, most tying
cases against banks are filed when borrowers are in default on the underly-
ing loan, after the alleged tie has long transpired. The few borrowers who
avail themselves of the Anti-Tying Provision's private right of action, there-
fore, do so cynically. In a following paper, I will explore protections of bor-
rower anonymity that the law could adopt, so as to enable borrowers to come
forward and report illegal tying to regulators earlier.
205. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52027.
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and Clayton acts that it must march in step to every minor fluc-
tuation. However, general anti-tying principles can be thought
of as a floor on all tying practices by financial entities. 6 If the
floor moves up significantly, so too should the baseline for
evaluating bank tying practices.
For decades, antitrust scholarship has been dominated by
the Chicago School, which holds out efficiency as the primary
concern of the antitrust laws and which advocates for a lighter,
market-based approach to antitrust regulation. In the wake of
the financial crisis, Chicago School adherents have found
themselves playing defense. 207 Disciples of the laissez-faire ap-
proach to regulation have tried to distinguish competition pol-
icy from financial regulation, arguing that greater scrutiny of
the latter should not translate into greater scrutiny of the for-
mer.2118 Since the 1980s, the Chicago School has comman-
deered the language of antitrust, infusing it with technical ter-
minology and mathematical proofs-at the expense of social
and political values.*19 Today, the pendulum is swinging back
toward broader values, without losing any of the analytical
rigor of efficiency arguments. 210
Recent developments in antitrust scholarship can help to
refute two counterarguments to this Article's proposals. First,
the work of Einer Elhauge21 serves as an incisive counterpoint
against calls to narrow the Anti-Tying Provision to prohibit
only those practices that have anticompetitive effects.2 12
206. Where the stricter bank tying restrictions are inapplicable, the Sher-
man and Clayton acts still govern. For example, bank holding companies
and their nonbank subsidiaries are exempt from the Anti-Tying Provision
but are still subject to the Sherman and Clayton acts. Id. at 52024-25.
207. On the rise of the Chicago School, see Jonathan B. Baker, Competition
Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRusT L.J. 483 (2006).
208. E.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. &
Puin. Pot'y 557 (2010).
209. See Sharon F. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and Monopoly
Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357 (2011); John J. Flynn, The Role of Rules in
Antitrust Analysis, 2006 U-rAH L. REv. 605 (2006).
210. See, e.g., Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22; Lande, Wealth Transfers as
the Original and Primary Concerns of Antitrust, supra note 22; Elhauge, supra
note 18.
211. Elhauge, supra note 18.
212. These arguments include the Justice Department memorandum ar-
guing that bank tying restrictions be harmonized with the more lax Sherman
Act, as well as comments urging the Federal Reserve to offer a blanket excep-
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Elhauge provides theoretical support for the proposition that
credit can be used as leverage to diminish competition and
harm consumers in a variety of settings.2 13 Another potential
criticism is that the Anti-Tying Provision would be transformed
into a much blunter instrument than originally foreseen-a
prophylactic against risk rather than a chisel directed at com-
petition. To this, the response from general antitrust scholar-
ship is that antitrust law embraces more holistic ideals than
just competition or efficiency.
This Part unfolds as follows: First, it looks at the use of
credit to achieve two types of anticompetitive effects-leverag-
ing and rate evasion. Second, this Part leaps into the fray on
the true measure of harm from tying, be it the welfare of bor-
rowers or a total welfare standard which includes banks. Fi-
nally, this Part points to examples of how general antitrust law
has accounted for concerns larger than competition and effi-
ciency, a broad perspective which justifies use of the Anti-Ty-
ing Provision as a check on financial risk.
A. Anticompetitive Effects
It is well established that Sherman Act and Clayton Act
tying analysis proceeds using a per se rule. As compared with a
more nuanced and deferential rule of reason analysis, the per
se rule is reserved for a small number of practices that courts
have deemed to be typically harmful. 214 In Supreme Court
pronouncements on tying, the per se approach remains the
law,2 1" even if this stricter standard has not been wholeheart-
edly endorsed.216 The debate over the proper standard stems
from a split over whether tying adversely affects competition.
tion for the tying of all derivatives to loans. See DOJ Letter, supra note 20;
ABASA Comment Letter, supra note 76.
213. See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 420 (summarizing how tying can oper-
ate as price discrimination, extract consumer surplus, and increase market
power).
214. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 275, 447. Such practices include
"price fixing, horizontal territorial or customer division, naked concerted
refusals to deal, resale price maintenance and some tying arrangements." Id.
at 275.
215. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
216. Writing for the majority in Jefferson Parish, Justice Stevens stated, "It is
far too late in the history of our antitrustjurisprudence to question the pro-
position that certain tying arrangements pose unacceptable risk of stifling
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
900 [Vol. 9:851
BANK ANTI-TYING PROVISION
This Subpart draws analogies between general tying re-
strictions and the Anti-Tying Provision to explain why bank ty-
ing practices are anticompetitive.
1. Credit as Leverage
a. The vitality of the leverage theory
The oldest criticism of tying (and also the oldest justifica-
tion of the per se standard) is the leverage theory.2 17 It holds
that if a monopolist dominates market share in the desired
product, then the monopolist can, via tying, leverage that
dominance into another monopoly. Hence, two monopolies
are created: in the desired product and in the tied product.
The monopolist can extract two sets of monopoly profits, forc-
ing consumers to pay more than under only one monopoly.2 18
Since the 1950s, scholars have challenged the presump-
tions underlying the leverage theory.2 19 In this vein, the single
monopoly profit theory of the Chicago School has been espe-
cially potent. It holds that a monopolist has no need to lever-
age its power in the desired product market into a second mo-
nopoly in the tied product market, because the monopolist
can maximize profits by charging more for the desired prod-
uct.2 2 1 For over half a century, the single monopoly profit the-
ory reigned over the academic literature on tying, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's pronouncements that per se
treatment is appropriate.2' 'This gap between caselaw and the
academy was bridged by a slew of lower court decisions that
chipped away at an unequivocal per se rule.22 2
competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'" 466 U.S. at 8. Despite
the tone of resignation, that sentence has become one of the most quoted in
all of anti-tying law.
217. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 459.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). Other notable pieces of criticism include: Rich-
ard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YAiLE L.J. 1397
(1967); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust
Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
220. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, § 7.9.
221. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (declining to extend the per se rule to the tying of Internet Ex-
plorer to Windows).
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In 2009, however, Elhauge defended per se scrutiny of ty-
ing in several circumstances.223 His argument can be broken
down as follows: First, tying can foreclose the tied product
market in two ways, which he calls the "foreclosure share ef-
fects. "22 4 Second, tying can create three types of "power ef-
fects," which do not necessarily foreclose the tied product mar-
ket but nevertheless operate as either price discrimination or
extraction of consumer surplus.225 Elhauge evaluates combina-
tions of foreclosure share effects and power effects to explain
why these five effects should be condemned. The combina-
tions indicate that the single profit monopoly theory depends
on three assumptions: a fixed ratio of desired to tied products,
a strong positive demand correlation between the two prod-
ucts, and a lack of substantial tied market foreclosure.22 6 With-
out any of the above, the single monopoly profit theory falls
apart.
b. As applied to bank tying practices
Bank tying practices do not satisfy the assumptions under-
lying the single monopoly profit theory (fixed ratio, strong
223. See Elhauge, supra note 18.
224. Specifically, (i) by impairing competitiveness in ways that increase
tied product prices and profits or (ii) by increasing the degree of tying mar-
ket power. Id. at 400.
225. Namely, (i) by allowing price discrimination (a) among buyers of the
tying product or (b) across buyers of both products or (ii) by extracting
consumer surplus from individual buyers. Id.
226. Id. at 400-01. Elhauge draws from a 1990 paper by Michael Whinston,
whose variation of the argument was that the single monopoly profit theory
holds only when (i) the tied market is perfectly competitive, (ii) the tied
products are complementary, and (iii) the tied products are consumed in
fixed proportions. See id. at 413 n.31; Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,
and Exclusion, 80 Am. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). See also EU TYING REPORT, Supra
note 6, at 60-61. Elhauge's analysis is complex. Under his formulation, single
monopoly profits actually result from five assumptions-fixed (i) tied and
(ii) tying market competitiveness, (iii) strong positive demand correlation,
and fixed usage of the (iv) tied and (v) tying products. Elhauge, supra note
18, at 404. However, for our purposes, the simpler three-element formula-
tion suffices. While each of the five assumptions above have been recognized
before, their combined effects are more realistic and yet more difficult to
model. Elhauge's conclusion from charting the effects is that single monop-
oly profits are rare, as such profits rest upon three broader requirements
(fixed ratio, strong positive demand correlation, and absence of substantial
foreclosure share). See id. at 420.
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positive demand correlation, and lack of substantial tied mar-
ket foreclosure). This Subpart will run through sample pair-
ings of credit and tied products, starting with a traditional
bank product such as trust services and then moving onto
more complicated product linkages, to show where the three
key assumptions identified by Elhauge fail.
When trust services are tied to a loan, there is very little
correlation in usage or demand between the desired and tied
products. Trust services entail the management by a trustee of
trust assets in accordance with the terms of a trust agree-
ment.227 These services are generally not complementary to
lending. Further, the market for trust services is hardly fixed-
at any time, there are numerous providers of trust services be-
yond banks, including foundations and individuals. 228
The same can be said of securities lending services. Bor-
rowers do not always desire or utilize securities lending agents
or custody services, so the use of credit is not a good predictor
of the consumption of these additional services. Curiously,
however, as we move into the realm of more sophisticated ser-
vices, the competitiveness of the tied product market begins to
change. The number of entities that can provide these services
dwindles, since these services have such exacting operational
requirements. Consolidation in the custody industry, for exam-
ple, has become commonplace, so that a handful of banks
dominate the custody (tied product) market today. 229 Yet even
if the tied product market is not competitive, securities lend-
ing services still do not meet the first two assumptions for the
single monopoly profit theory to hold.
When we turn to swaps, the interplay between tying and
the single monopoly profit theory is at its most complicated.
Swaps tend to be paired with other financial instruments, be-
cause a swap's value is pegged to the value of an underlying
227. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN ET Al., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: INCLUD-
ING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 379-80 (4th ed. 2010); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 (2012).
228. However, institutional management of trusts has experienced consol-
idation in recent years. See Amy Oxley et al., A Look Back on a Quarter-Century
of Death and Dirt, 26-FEB PROB. & PROP. 10, 11 (2012) (noting a drop in the
number of institutions managing trust assets).
229. See Chan et al., supra note 69, at 21 (noting that in the foreign securi-
ties market, the top 10 custodians held 77% of the securities in 2005, and
that the domestic market is dominated by four players).
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obligation. Demand between loans and swaps should correlate
positively and strongly, as there would be little reason to
purchase a swap in the absence of an underlying credit.230 The
ratio of usage of loans and swaps should also be relatively
fixed, as borrowers have no reason to purchase multiple swaps
on any given loan. In these ways, two of the three assumptions
buttressing the single monopoly profit theory seem to apply.
The third assumption for the single monopoly profit the-
ory-the competitiveness of the tied product market-
presents the greater analytical challenge. Derivatives trading is
dominated by four or five large banks. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which compiles quarterly
reports ranking bank derivatives positions, reveals that the
same six banks almost always top the list: JPMorgan Chase,
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Wells Fargo, and
HSBC. 231 Thus, the derivatives market (the tied product mar-
ket) is largely foreclosed. Coincidentally, in lending (the de-
sired product market), the four largest US commercial banks
have consistently been JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Ci-
tibank, and Wells Fargo.232 Collectively comprising the "league
of trillionaires," because the consolidated holdings of each of
230. Swaps complement credit so closely that it challenges our intuitions
about whether two products are being sold. Tying requires the sale of two
separate products, the test for separateness being whether the "tying item is
commonly sold separately from the tied item in a well functioning market."
HOEVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 453. Banks have argued that swaps and credit
are in fact one product. See, e.g., Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives,
supra note 5, at 24-26; ABASA Comment Letter, supra note 76, at 7-9. Despite
the close functional fit, swaps and credit do meet the test for separateness;
for each can be sold separately in an open market.
231. OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2011 REPORT, supra note 57, at 1 ("Deriva-
tives activity in the U.S. banking system continues to be dominated by a small
group of large financial institutions. Five large commercial banks represent
96% of the total banking industry notional amounts and 86% of industry net
current credit exposure.").
232. See Statistical Release, Federal Reserve Board, Large Commercial
Banks (Sept. 30, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
lbr/current/default.htm. Prior to its purchase in 2008 by Wells Fargo, Wa-
chovia was perennially on that list as well. See Statistical Release, Federal Re-
serve Board, Large Commercial Banks (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20091231/lrg-bnk Ist.pdf.
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these entities surpass the trillion-dollar mark,233 these are also
the banks most likely to arrange loan syndications.23 4
The correlation between the largest commercial banks
and the largest derivatives traders is not happenstance. This
correlation can be explained in two possible ways: either lever-
age of credit or pre-existing barriers to entry in the swaps mar-
ket.
First, perhaps the trillionaires have leveraged their way
into dominance in the derivatives market via their dominance
in the credit market. Suppose, for example, that a large For-
tune 500 company ("Big Borrower"), which is the borrower in
a syndication, is told by the lead agent ("Big Bank"), a domi-
nant player in the syndication market, that its services are con-
tingent upon Big Borrower purchasing an interest rate swap
from Big Bank. Big Borrower feels it has no choice and relents.
Over time, the repetition of this scenario with other borrowers
could enable Big Bank to preempt the entry of competitors
into the interest rate swap market. Other banks might be will-
ing to sell interest rate swaps, but Big Bank has cornered the
swaps market by lending money to all the potential swaps buy-
ers and then preventing them from obtaining swaps elsewhere.
Alternatively, the derivatives market might be foreclosed
by the technical barriers to entry. Derivatives trading requires
sophisticated operational capacities.2 15 While small- and mid-
sized banks can participate in the swaps market,236 the players
233. As of third quarter 2012, the consolidated assets of the largest four
banks were $1.85 trillion for JPMorgan Chase, $1.45 trillion for Bank of
America, $1.37 trillion for Citibank, and $1.21 trillion for Wells Fargo. The
fifth biggest bank, US Bank, lagged nearly one order of magnitude behind at
$341 billion. See id.
234. Note, though, that Goldman Sachs is less a commercial bank than an
investment bank, which has chosen to organize as a bank holding company.
See Michael J. de la Merced et al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era
Ends, N.Y. TIM Es (Sept. 21, 2008), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/
21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-companies/; Press Release,
Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs to Become the Fourth Largest Bank Hold-
ing Company (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-rela-
tions/press-releases/archived/2008/bank-holding-co.html.
235. Karen L. Skidmore, Independent Directors Council Task Force Report:
Board Oversight of Derivatives, ST007 ALI-ABA 197 (2011).
236. See Johnson, Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives, supra note 5, at 15
("Even smaller banks have earned significant profits from their involvement
with OTC derivatives.").
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may have to outsource many of the expensive "back office"
functions to larger banks. 237 The swaps market has thus been
overtaken by the league of trillionaires.238
If the trillionaires have leveraged their way into the swaps
(the tied product) market, then tying would be anticompeti-
tive. If the swaps market were simply uncompetitive because of
high barriers to entry, then the single monopoly profit theory
would not apply, and there would be the propensity for lever-
age. Either way, tying would usher in anticompetitive effects.
2. Tying as Rate Evasion
Rate evasion occurs commonly in industries where output
price is set by regulation-for example, in utilities, where the
players are often true monopolies. Frequently, the set price is
lower than the producer's profit-maximizing price, in which
case the producer will tie other products or services to the con-
sumer's purchase of the desired product.239 The tied products
will not be subject to price controls; charging more for the tied
products allows the producer to recoup the lost profits from
the desired product.240 While the body of cases on rate evasion
is not as voluminous as on leverage, courts have found produc-
ers liable where tying is used to evade price controls on the
desired product.2 4 ' The Justice Department, too, has con-
demned price evasion in its guidelines on vertical mergers. 242
Price evasion harms competitors in the tied product market
(because producers can leverage their monopoly in the de-
sired product market) and consumers (because consumers are
forced to pay more). 243
237. Cf id. at 17-18 (detailing how smaller banks can participate in the
derivatives market despite a lack of trading and back office support).
238. Over 95% of the notional amount of all derivatives positions can be
traced to the five largest players. See OCC's FOURTH QUARTER 2011 REPORT,
supra note 57.
239. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 464.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 790 (2d
Cir. 1983). See also William E. Kovacic, Exclusive Dealing, Full Line Forcing, and
Tie-Ins, 1163 PLI/Corp 77 (2000). NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128
(1988) is another frequently mentioned price evasion case; though, there
tying was not implicated.
242. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 4.23 (1984).
243. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 464.
Imaged with Persmission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business
906 [Vol. 9:851
BANK ANTI-TYING PROVISION
In the banking sector, tying can be used to evade low in-
terest rates, which have hovered in the single digits since the
financial crisis. In the non-syndication markets in particular,
intense competition among banks tends to keep spreads very
close to these low rates. Another source of downward pressure
on rates is the Federal Reserve itself, which has set rates low so
as to spur lending. These trends have the effect of mimicking a
regulated industry where output must adhere to fixed prices.
While banks are certainly free to set their rates far in excess of
the prime rate or LIBOR, market and governmental pressures
force banks to keep rates low. Banks therefore can respond by
tying other services at a markup to offset the lower profitability
of lending. High markups for, say, trust services, asset manage-
ment, and swaps avoids the effect of the de facto rate regula-
tion.
To expound upon general antitrust rationales for striking
tying as a rate evasion mechanism, we can analogize the harm
suffered by competitors under rate evasion scenarios as a type
of harm inflicted through leverage by a dominant player in the
desired product market. In the tied product market, financial
service providers may have difficulty selling swaps because the
potential buyers happen to be borrowers who end up ob-
taining swaps from dominant lenders. Simultaneously, in the
desired product market, lenders that do not tie may be injured
by lenders that tie. A non-tying lender might only be able to
offer a variable-rate loan at prime rate plus 6 percent, while a
lender that ties can offer a rate of prime rate plus 5 percent
and then make up the lost profits by charging more for tied
products. The borrower who shops for loans by comparing
only the interest rates may forego business with the non-tying
lender.
From a normative standpoint, there may be little reason
to sympathize with the non-tying bank; it has failed to invest in
the ability to offer a diverse menu of products from which to
capture lost profits from lending. Yet if we turn to the harm to
consumers from rate evasion, we may find stronger cause to
condemn tying. This is because borrowers are paying higher
prices for tied products, 244 although that fact is obscured by
244. See id. at 465 (noting that consumers are harmed either because tying
pushes the price of the tied product above their reservation price or, more
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the "discount" on the loan. This propensity of tying to obfus-
cate is at the heart of objections to the practice.24 5
3. Significance
One conclusion of applying Elhauge's theory is that a
commercial bank that holds a large share of the credit market
may use that dominance to leverage into higher profitability
and larger shares of markets in various tied products. The use
of credit as leverage or rate evasion would create anticompeti-
tive effects for competitors and consumers. Speculations that
bank tying does not produce anticompetitive effects are inap-
posite.246
Another conclusion is that Elhauge's theory vindicates the
strict per se treatment of bank tying practices. If tied products,
ranging from traditional bank products to more complex
swaps, threaten the integrity of competitive markets, then a
bright-line approach will be more efficient than a deferential
standard that permits inquiry into anticompetitive effects with
each action.24 7
B. Efficiency Versus Consumer Welfare
1. The Resurgence of Consumer Welfare
Antitrust scholars have spilled much ink on the proper
measurement of harm under anticompetitive practices. One
camp, comprised of efficiency-minded scholars, judges, and
enforcers, advances a "total welfare" standard, which would
permit practices whose benefit to producers outweighs the
harm to consumers.2 4 8 The most well-known proponent of this
commonly, because they pay more for the tied product than the competitive
price).
245. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 242, § 4.23 (articulating
rate evasion challenges to vertical mergers). The Non-Horizontal Merger
Guidelines provide the example of a regulated utility company purchasing
its supplier, after which the utility company could arbitrarily inflate the
prices that it pays to the supplier and then pass those inflated prices off to
consumers as legitimate costs.
246. But see DOJ Letter, supra note 20 (arguing that bank tying practices
do not lessen, but may actually increase, competition).
247. But cf id. (decrying the per se standard under the Anti-Tying Provi-
sion).
248. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Bruno Peixoto, ReformulatingAntitrust Rules to
Safeguard Societal Wealth, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225 (2008); David S. Evans
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perspective is Robert Bork, whose analysis of the Sherman Act
in 1966 paved the way for the Chicago School's argument that
the benefits to monopolists and cartels should be factored into
the total calculus of efficiency, as an offset to consumer
harm.249 For the ease of reference, we will call this group the
"efficiency" camp.
Another camp maintains that antitrust law should only ac-
count for consumers in measuring harm.25 0 As justification,
this group points to the legislative history of the Sherman Act
and Supreme Court and lower court decisions, whose con-
cerns seem to revolve only around "consumers."2 5 ' Lower
prices, better products, and more choice are all pro-consumer
goals of competition policy to be heralded above efficiency.252
We will refer to this camp as the "consumer welfare" camp.2 5 3
Whether one focuses narrowly on consumers or broadly
on a totality which includes producers in turn dictates one's
willingness to sanction tying practices. Efficiency scholars are
quick to point out the efficiencies inherent in tying, which
translate into reduced costs that theoretically get passed onto
consumers as reduced prices. 254 Yet consumer welfare scholars
argue that gains from anticompetitive practices are at the ex-
pense of consumers.2 5 5
& Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive
Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YAiE. J. ON REc. 37 (2005). Total
wealth is sometimes known as "societal wealth" or "aggregate wealth."
249. See Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 7 (1966). See also Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22, at 198 (dissect-
ing Bork's nomenclature).
250. See, e.g., Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22; Robert H. Lande, Con-
sumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Prt L. Rv. 503 (2001).
251. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22; Elhauge, supra note 18, at 438.
252. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22, at 192.
253. Another way to think of the efficiency-consumer welfare dichotomy is
as a schism between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency. The efficiency camp
would not strike anticompetitive practices that benefit one group (produc-
ers) more than they hurt another (consumers). Such practices would be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
254. See Devlin & Peixoto, supra note 248, at 257.
255. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 22, at 220. For tying specifically, pro-
ducers can use product linkages as a price discrimination mechanism dis-
proportionately siphons surplus from heavy users of a tied product. The
literature on price discrimination is rich. For a recent assessment, see Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm,
52 ARIZ. L. RiEv. 925 (2010) (showing that there are many different forms of
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The common argument of efficiency scholars against the
consumer welfare standard in tying is that no consumer profit
can be extracted in the tied market. This argument rests upon
(i) the single monopoly profit theory, which undercuts the
claim of leverage, and (ii) the fact that tying occurs in compet-
itive markets, where abuse of consumers is difficult. Hence,
there must be non-consumer-welfare-extraction reasons to
tie.256 Put differently, tying must be to serve producer efficien-
cies only (rather than extracting consumer surplus).
2. Borrower Welfare, Not Banking Welfare
A consumer welfare standard applied to bank tying prac-
tices would translate to borrower welfare. A total welfare stan-
dard would pit the gains to financial institutions against the
losses to borrowers; if the former outweighs the latter, tying
will be deemed Kaldor-Hicks efficient. With the hindsight of
scandal after scandal from the financial crisis, evaluating bank
tying practices from the total welfare perspective seems unten-
able.257
While giving free reign to banks to tie financial products
would produce numerous benefits to banks, the risks
presented to borrowers from untested products, as well as to
the economy as a whole from the injection of risk, cannot be
justified by simply adding up the costs and benefits. Here the
analogies between antitrust and financial regulation are not so
straightforward. The maximization of profits is presumed to
have a component of self-correction in antitrust regulation,
due to competition and passing profits through to consum-
ers. 258 Yet there is good cause to be skeptical of profit max-
imization in the banking industry, which leads perversely to
price discrimination and that consumer welfare only suffers under a few of
them).
256. Devlin & Peixoto, supra note 248, at 257-59.
257. It would be hard to imagine, for instance, any defense of the manipu-
lation of LIBOR by the cartel of banks which set the rate, even if the gains to
the cartel outweigh the losses to investors and consumers. Even more to the
point, for our purposes, the fallout of LIBOR would not have been so vast
had interest rate swaps pegged to LIBOR not been pushed upon small and
medium-sized borrowers. See supra text accompanying notes 100 and 101.
258. See Devlin, supra note 208.
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risk.25 9 This skepticism would counsel for a stricter standard in
the regulation of bank tying, one that focuses narrowly on bor-
rowers in evaluating harm.
The counterarguments offered up by efficiency scholars
in defense of a total welfare standard are either misplaced or
inapplicable to bank tying. First, the single monopoly profit
theory, which supports the total welfare standard has been
called into question. 260 Second, the invocation to competition
in the desired and tied product markets2 6 ' is not neatly appli-
cable to banking. The banking industry is at once uncompeti-
tive and ultracompetitive, 262 but even in uncompetitive seg-
ments, tying can be used to reduce competition.
At the elite level, competition is scarce. The banks that
dominate loan syndications tend to be the same trillionaires
that have also cornered the derivatives market. The majority of
banks simply do not have sufficient assets to arrange for syndi-
cations or to invest in the "back office" infrastructure necessary
to carry out the operational tasks of derivatives trading or se-
curities lending. Where tied products are complex, then, opt-
ing for the borrower welfare standard should be uncontrover-
sial. After all, the banks affected would be the same entities
that enjoy little competition.
At the level of commodity products such as deposit and
trust services, competition is intense. Here, it is the industry's
259. A fuller quote on this point from Devlin, a defender of efficiency who
actually comes down hard on the banking industry, is compelling:
The incentive to maximize profits, which fuels the self-correcting
nature of the market in antitrust cases, causes problems in the
banking industry. Here, faith in the market is in many ways re-
versed . . . . The pursuit of ever-greater profits in the banking sec-
tor, which is magnified by risk-taking incentives in the form of
FDIC insurance, securitization, and high discount rates, will not
yield a desirable and stable equilibrium. Id. at 588-89.
260. See Elhauge, supra note 18.
261. Competition in the desired product market means that leverage is
not possible; competition in the tied product market means that tying is not
profitable. Evans & Salinger, supra note 248, at 38-39.
262. The AFP Survey demonstrates the leverage that lenders to large com-
panies wield, due to the smaller pool of banks. On the tendency of banks to
compete intensely by mimicking each other, see Jonathan R. Macey &James
P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial
Regulation, 120 YAi.E L.J. 1368, 1383-85 (2011) (detailing the lemmings-like
behavior of banks).
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model to create financial products and then push them relent-
lessly in the narrow window before competitors copy the prod-
ucts and begin doing the same.2 63 However, there are still
challenges to the adoption of a total welfare standard. Empiri-
cally, there are strong indications that credit is often used as
leverage. 264 Credit is, after all, the desired product that fo-
ments a relationship between a borrower and a bank. The AFP
Survey indicates that in order to access credit in today's mar-
ket, borrowers must reach a threshold of overall profitability
for the bank to enter into a lending relationship.265 This prof-
itability will not likely be met by lending, because rates are so
low, but can be met through the purchase of other products
and services. If borrowers assent to the purchase of those tied
products and services, the bank will lend; if not, the bank will
forego the relationship. This all comes about solely because of
the power of credit, which can be a lifeline to many businesses
and families.
C. The Goals of Antitrust Law
1. Economic Versus Social and Political Concerns
The debate surrounding the ultimate goals of antitrust is
as old as antitrust law itself. The deepest schisms have oc-
curred over whether those goals, such as the protection of so-
cial, moral, and political concerns, are economic or
noneconomic. 266 For the most part, the economic camp has
prevailed, and here, as elsewhere in antitrust, the Chicago
School's efficiency approach has been dominant.267 Since the
197 0s, scholars who back the efficiency approach have man-
aged to frame antitrust as a set of laws that safeguard eco-
263. See PARTNOY, supra note 44. Swaps, too, have been commoditized
somewhat. See Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTI-
TRusT LJ. 313, 332-33 (2010) ("[A]s it relates to the financial crisis,J.P. Mor-
gan innovated with new forms of credit default swaps precisely because com-
peting investment banks copied prior financial innovations and industry
margins were eradicated . . . .").
264. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
265. See AFP SURVEY, supra note 6, at 10.
266. For a succinct summary, see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concerns of Antitrust, supra note 22, at 67-79.
267. Id.
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nomic efficiency.268 Other concerns have been dismissed as
"intellectual mush"269 and "poetry."27 1 Nonetheless, due to its
unbending exclusion of alternative goals of antitrust, some of
the Chicago School's precepts have been challenged.27'
In defense of social, moral, and political goals in antitrust
law, other scholars have evoked Jeffersonian ideals of disper-
sion of power.27 2 The skepticism of concentration of power in
the Sherman and Clayton acts bespeaks, for instance, a fear
that corporate influence can smother political freedoms.273
Other challenges to the pre-eminence of efficiency have been
more modest and cabined within an economic rubric-for ex-
ample, the argument that the antitrust laws were passed to fur-
ther the distributive goal of "preventing unfair acquisitions of
consumers' wealth." 274 The challenge to these positions, espe-
cially the further one gets from economic analysis, is that so-
cial and political goals are often seen as unworkable, in both
definition and analysis.275
Arguments for social and political goals were most vigor-
ous in the 1980s, with the ascendancy of the Chicago School
during the Reagan administration. These arguments then
268. The most famous example is Robert Bork, who argued that the Sher-
man Act's consumer welfare prescription was tantamount to economic effi-
ciency. See RonERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). See also RICHARD
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PFRSPECTrIvE (1976).
269. Panel Discussion: Merger Enforcement and Practice, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 223,
238 (1982) (comments of Robert Bork).
270. David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 807 n.60 (1989) (citing Robert Bork, 'No-Fault' Mo-
nopolization Proposal Debated by Presidential Commission on Antitrust Reform,
LJuly-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 880, at A-22 (1978)).
271. Although on the whole Hovenkamp takes an economic approach to
antitrust analysis, he nevertheless acknowledges that there is room for
noneconomic concerns. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 77 ("Much of the
Chicago School analysis is written as if there were only one antitrust statute
and it read 'Promote business efficiency.' But that is not the antitrust statute
that we have. The antitrust student begins with a body of statutes in which
economic efficiency plays a disturbingly small part . . . . [C]ompeting con-
cerns . . . simply cannot be ignored. If they are, then we are not living in a
democratic society.").
272. See Barnes, supra note 270.
273. See id.
274. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concerns of Antitrust,
supra note 22, at 70.
275. See Barnes, supra note 270, at 806.
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waned for decades-until the financial crisis propelled the old
debates to the forefront of antitrust circles again. Some have
recently called for a more prominent role for the "populist
school" of the 1960s and 1970s, which focused on firm size,
political influence, and other noneconomic goals. 2 7 6 Others
have cautioned against an over-reactive course correction that
sidelines economic analysis.277
2. Risk as Economic and Noneconomic Interest
As between the two poles of economic and noneconomic
interests, the goals of the Anti-Tying Provision would appear to
be simple: economic. Its legislative history references concerns
about "misuse of economic power" and "fair competition" by
banks.27N Yet that history also makes clear that the Anti-Tying
Provision is not to interfere with "appropriate traditional bank-
ing practices,"279 a topic that was taken up during the passage
of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments, of
which the Anti-Tying Provision is part and parcel. Discussion
of traditional banking practices involved a "public interest
standard" by which innovation and expansion into nonbank-
ing activities was to be evaluated.28 o Hence, the expansiveness
with which we might read the Anti-Tying Provision in the ser-
vice of noneconomic goals is not entirely settled by looking at
legislative history.
If we are to fill in the gaps by turning to general antitrust
law, it would not be a great stretch to slot risk into either the
economic or noneconomic paradigms. Risk can be couched as
an economic concern, since the assessment of risk is but an
estimation of the potential for financial and economic dam-
age. The injection of risk into bank tying analysis does not re-
quire significant departures from the dominance of economics
in antitrust, just that the focus is broadened from efficiency.
And if risk implicates noneconomic concerns, then from cur-
rent developments in antitrust policy we know that there
276. See Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role ofAntitrust in Distressed Indus-
ties, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 290-91 (2010).
277. See Devlin, supra note 208.
278. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 5535.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 5532-33.
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should be room to consider the social, political, and moral
components of sequestering financial risk as well.28 '
Of course, bank tying restrictions are a different matter
than general antitrust considerations, so the analogies can
only go so far. After all, the Anti-Tying Provision was intended
to be more rigorous than its Sherman and Clayton Act coun-
terparts,"2 2 and the centrality of banking to the economy has
no parallels.28 3 Even defenders of a laissez-faire approach to
antitrust must concede that the alignment of profit-maximiza-
tion with risk-taking in banking merits a stronger regulatory
regime. 284 On balance, then, if it comes down to a choice be-
tween expanding versus maintaining the understanding of the
Anti-Tying Provision so as to accommodate the analysis of risk,
it would seem that regulators should err on the side of expan-
sion.
Finally, lest there be fears that the consideration of risk
would transform the Anti-Tying Provision into an unwieldy fo-
rum, it should be mentioned that risk might be challenging to
quantify, but it is not impossible to assess. Experienced regula-
tors and risk officers understand how to assess the likelihood
of future catastrophes in accordance with present-day
benchmarks. Risk is therefore not as protean as other political,
social, and moral goals of antitrust, and arguably risk is no
more difficult to pin down than efficiency.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The Anti-Tying Provision has weathered several rounds of
changes in regulatory philosophy over the 42 years since its
enactment. The law has gone from an ambitious anti-tying pro-
scription to a set of exceptions-laden rules that was powerless
281. There is indication in the Anti-Tying Provision's legislative history
that the law had envisioned "small independent businessmen" as its benefi-
ciaries. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 5580. This term is remi-
niscent of Jefferson's image of an egalitarian, agrarian society where large
businesses play a small role.
282. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 11, at 52027.
283. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 5520 ("[B]ecause of the impor-
tance of the banking system to the national economy, adequate safeguards
should be provided against undue concentration of control of banking activ-
ities ..... .
284. See Devlin, supra note 208.
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as banks tied the types of risky products that brought down the
global financial system in 2008. In many ways, the evolution of
the Anti-Tying Provision has been a compressed recapitulation
of developments in general anti-tying law.
Today, the need for stronger bank tying restrictions is par-
amount. As banks devise new products to make up for tighter
profit margins, it is likely that those new products will make
their way onto the market by way of borrowers, as products
tied to loans. Recent scandals of aggressive cross-selling and
mis-selling of interest rate swaps bundled with loans portend
an environment where risky products will continue to be
pushed upon purveyors of credit.
A more robust Anti-Tying Provision would be an elegant
response to increased experimentation with, and cross-selling
of, risky financial products. The provision already has a built-in
firewall between loans and riskier products that mimics Glass-
Steagall's separation of commercial and investment activity, as
well as the Volcker Rule's purging of risky trading and invest-
ment activity from commercial banks. The provision also en-
capsulates many of the policy considerations underlying gen-
eral antitrust law, such as promotion of competition, protec-
tion of consumers, and pursuit of a broad array of goals.
As regulators and industry in banking adjust to the post-
2008 landscape, all sides may find that sensible solutions lie in
antitrust law. With its voluminous case law and scholarly out-
put, antitrust law provides a flexible framework which is adept
at balancing a myriad of interests. Many of the problems
plaguing financial institutions today are some variation of anti-
trust problems.28 5 Banking and antitrust law will likely con-
verge to solve these problems, and existing financial regula-
tions that incorporate antitrust principles-such as the Anti-
Tying Provision-will enjoy resurgence and heightened prom-
inence.
285. For example, the LIBOR scandal, increasing consolidation, and the
dominance of the trillionaires in several product markets.
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